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It’s Not That Difficult:
The Shared Economic Growth
Solution to Tax Reform
Matthew Lykken
I. The Problem to Be Solved
In 1987, when I was an IRS field attorney, I saw a
disturbing trend emerging in the IRS Statistics of Income data.
American income and wealth was becoming increasingly
concentrated at the top, and our middle class was stagnating. I
knew that human history is filled1 with examples of prosperous
societies that faded when wealth became overly concentrated so
that consumers lacked power to buy and the decline in social
mobility undermined the efficient use of talent. America is not
immune from this phenomenon, as Federal Reserve Governor
Sarah Bloom Raskin has observed.2 When I became a corporate
tax planner and was able to observe how the economy works, the
causes of this concentration became clear.
Our economy is structured such that all income flows to
capital, i.e., to people with money, except to the extent that labor
or other players have power to extract a share. As automation


Matthew Lykken has been an international tax attorney for 30 years, starting
as an IRS District Counsel field attorney and then working for both U.S.- and
foreign-owned corporations in multiple industries in the United States, Europe
and Asia.
1. See H.G. WELLS, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD (1922) (for example,
the rise and fall of Rome paralleled the rise and decay of the plebeians, and
India’s glory under egalitarian Buddhism decayed with the reassertion of
Brahman caste culture).
2. See Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Address at the “Building a Financial Structure for a More Stable and
Equitable Economy” 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State
of the U.S. and World Economies (Apr. 18, 2013); Sarah Bloom Raskin,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Society of
Government Economists and the National Economists Club (May 16, 2013); see
also Kenneth Rogoff, The Inequality Wildcard, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 4,
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-inequality-wildcard.
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increased productivity, unskilled workers lost market power
while the skilled machine masters remained valuable. As
globalization made it easier to access cheap foreign labor,
America’s unskilled workers lost far more market power, though
again higher-skilled workers, whose jobs were more difficult to
replicate in third-world locations, were less affected. Thus far,
then, the economists’ beloved notion of comparative advantage
retained some validity – the pie increased, and America’s
relatively skilled labor force should have been able to claim a
healthy slice.
However, another element – an unnecessary self-inflicted
wound – undermined that system. America’s tax policy, formed
during a period when American technology and economic might
dominated the world, became suicidal as the rest of the world
began to catch up. Our tax system provides a strong incentive
to locate high-value, high-profit operations outside of the United
States. In some cases, it would cost a company 54% more after
tax (for the same pre-tax cost) to build a plant in America than
it would cost to build the same plant in any other country, and
further the company can make 54% more after-tax operating
profit by having that plant in the right country.3 So, rather than
having to use $154MM to build a plant that earns $65MM a year,
it can use $100MM to build a plant that earns $100MM a year,
which gives it a 137% higher return on its investment.
Corporations, as rational actors, have therefore been locating
their high-profit operations, the very operations where workers
can command high wages, in other countries while foreign
governments have structured their systems and worker training
to take advantage of the American blunder.
As Congress and the IRS witnessed an increasing portion of
the profits of U.S. companies being earned abroad, they put in

3. If the company had to bring home cash from a zero-tax location to build
the plant in America, it would have to pay a 35% U.S. tax on the cash
repatriation, so that it would have to bring home $154 to net $100 of investable
cash. It could avoid that tax cost by instead building the plant in any country
except our own. If the profit-making operations were located in a zero-taxed
jurisdiction, then the company would be able to keep the full $100 for any $100
earned. If the operations were located in America, it would instead suffer a
35% federal tax plus state taxes, clearing less than $65. For simplicity these
figures assume that the 3.1% benefit of section 199 of the Internal Revenue
Code, domestic manufacturing deduction, is offset by state taxes.
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place rules and audit techniques designed to ensure that the
profits allocated abroad were attributable to real foreign
substance. Predictably, that merely resulted in corporations
moving more jobs abroad in order to ensure that the foreign
operations had adequate substance. Initiatives such as the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(“OECD”) recently published plan for addressing base erosion
and profit shifting4 will further aggravate the problem by
increasing the tax risk from maintaining certain high-value jobs
in the United States.
You can see the effects clearly in general statistics on the
declining share of income flowing to labor.5 Labor income as a
share of total income has declined by about 10% since the 1970s,
meaning that capital’s share has increased by some 25%,
depending on the measure used.6 Wage and salary accruals as
a percentage of total Gross Domestic Product have declined from
just under 54% in 1970 to under 44% now.7 You can see the
impact of this loss of market power on different income groups
in the details of the American wage statistics. Unskilled
workers flatlined back in the late 1970s and then began to lose
ground. Typical earnings for a full-time male high school
graduate in 1972 were $45,000 (in 2003 dollars), but had
dropped to $30,000 by 2005.8 Over time, this effect has worked
its way up through the ranks of increasingly skilled segments of
4. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON
BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter OECD].
5. See Margaret Jacobson & Filippo Occhino, Behind the Decline in
Labor’s Share of Income, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEV. (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter
Jacobson
&
Occhino,
Behind
the
Decline],
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/Newsroom%20and%20Events/Publications/E
conomic%20Trends/2012/Behind%20the%20Decline%20in%20Labors%20Sha
re%20of%20Income.aspx; Margaret Jacobson & Filippo Occhino, Labor’s
Declining Share of Income and Rising Inequality, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEV.
(Sept. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Jacobson & Occhino, Labor’s Declining Share of
Income], http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2012/2012-13.cfm.
6. Jacobson & Occhino, Labor’s Declining Share of Income, supra note 5.
7. FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, SHARES OF GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME:
COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES, PAID: WAGE AND SALARY ACCRUALS:
DISBURSEMENTS:
TO
PERSONS
(2014),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/W270RE1A156NBEA.
8. David Deming & Susan Dynarski, College Aid, in TARGETING
INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN: FIGHTING POVERTY WHEN RESOURCES ARE LIMITED
283, 283-84 (Phillip B. Levine & David J. Zimmerman, eds., 2010).
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the workforce, reaching the professional class starting in the late
90s.9 Statistics compiled from census data by the National
Center for Education Statistics show that real median incomes
for males with bachelor’s degrees or master’s degrees peaked in
2001, those for males with professional degrees peaked in 2000,
and those for males with doctoral degrees have been basically
flat since 1997. Females, who still earn noticeably less than
their male peers, followed a similar profile save that females
with professional degrees peaked in 2005.10
You can also see it in the continuing concentration of income
and wealth. While a great deal of recent tax policy has been
based on the notion that the top 10% are “wealthy,” the income
share of the 90 to 95% group has remained essentially level since
1973. The share of the 96% to 99% group increased somewhat
from about 13% to 16%. The share of the infamous top 1%
increased from 8% to some 23% in the same period, but that is
also misleading, as again the real concentration was at the top
of the top, with the top 0.1% bracket’s share rising from less than
1% to some 6%.11 It should be noted that the way these effects
work through the economy are complicated. While job location
decisions by multinationals have decreased employee market
power, that effect is largely seen in the wages that smaller
businesses pay. In the first decade of the millennium, all real
growth in wage income in America accrued to employees of large
corporations, while wages of employees of smaller businesses
declined or stayed flat.12 Multinational administration requires
9. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for
Employee
Compensation,
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/ecec_nr.htm#2008 (last updated Mar. 12,
2015) (inflation adjusted to June 2013 dollars).
10. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl. 395
(2011),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_395.asp.
11. EMMANUEL SAEZ, U. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, STRIKING IT RICHER: THE
EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES Fig. 2, 3 (2013), available at
elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf. The percentage cut-offs
in these charts are based upon taxable returns, which exclude a large portion
of all return-filing families. Id. Thus, the cut-off for the top 1% in 2011 was
below $200,000 for all returns. Id.
12. JOHN HALTIWANGER ET AL., KAUFFMAN FOUND., BUSINESS DYNAMICS
STATISTICS BRIEFING: JOB CREATION, WORKER CHURNING, AND WAGES AT YOUNG
BUSINESSES
1,
10-12
(2012),
available
at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and
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a lot of educated labor. The “top of the bottom,” the skilled and
educated workers below the top half of one percent that have
been keeping the upper-middle class alive, are largely the people
who administer or serve corporate headquarters,13 and they are
the people who spend their wages to allow retail, food,
construction, and service industries to survive.14 With the
%20covers/2012/11/bds_report_7.pdf.
13. This can be seen intuitively by examining the Bureau of Labor
Statistics table of occupational wage data and scanning for occupations of the
sort one associates with corporate headquarters – not only management, but
HR, accountants, lawyers, analysts, executive secretaries, etc. News Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 9. The tables show that these
occupations earn well more than the average, and further that compensation
for employees in larger enterprises is generally significantly higher than that
for employees in smaller enterprises. The flat trends in average income shown
above are despite a shift in employment to high-skilled jobs, led by increased
employment by women in the managerial and professional jobs associated with
corporate headquarters, which when coupled with the observations of
HALTIWANGER ET AL., supra note 12, indicates that American families would
have suffered substantially more if corporate headquarters functions had
declined. See generally Didem Tüzemen & Jonathan Willis, The Vanishing
Middle: Job Polarization and Workers’ Response to the Decline in Middle Skill
Jobs, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., 2013, at 5, available at
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/13q1tuzemen-willis.pdf.
14. An immense amount of nonsense has been written asserting that
“small business” is the main driver of American employment. Dry cleaners and
candle shops did not save Detroit when the major corporate automobile
manufacturing operations moved elsewhere. Likewise, the relative economic
health of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metroplex obviously does not flow from
Minnesotans being superior plumbers or waiters, but rather from the area’s
ability to attract corporate headquarters with its relatively well-educated
professional class, although even there the list is shrinking. See Adam Belz &
Patrick Kennedy, The Star-Tribune 100: This Year, It’s a Top-Heavy List,
MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRIBUNE
(May
19,
2013),
http://www.startribune.com/business/207950651.html. The Twin Cities
metropolitan statistical area has 1.6% of the nation’s employee income, but
some 4% of compensation for corporate management while only1.4% of
maintenance and food service compensation. Regional Data, Bureau of Econ.
Analysis,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Commerce,
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=5#re
qid=70&step=30&isuri=1&7022=54&7023=7&7024=naics&7033=1&7025=5&7026=33460&7027=2013,2008,2003&7001=754&7028=1&7031=5&7040=-1&7083=percentofmetroportion&7029=55&7090=70 (last
visited May 24, 2015). Large corporations are the engines and small business
is the caboose they pull, a caboose that provides only twenty-three percent of
total U.S. non-owner labor payments. See MATTHEW KNITTEL ET AL., OFFICE OF
TAX ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY SMALL
BUSINESSES AND THEIR OWNERS
4, 14
(2011),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
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destruction of the ability of would-be retirees to earn a
reasonable return on their savings in the aftermath of the 2008
financial meltdown, 47% of working Americans over 50 expect to
have to delay retirement by at least three years, and 82% expect
to have to work part-time in retirement,15 the beginning of a
vicious cycle in which lack of income will lead to more
competition for jobs leading to even lower wages.
In 2005, my colleagues and I, all international tax attorneys
who could see what was happening and all parents who feared
for our children, decided to look for a fix for this policy problem.
We predicted that the decline in middle-class purchasing power
would cause our economy to collapse when the rampant
government-backed debt stimulus that had been in place since
the late 90s began to fail.16 We knew then that the deficit was
getting out of control, so we sought a solution that would be
revenue neutral on a current basis and revenue positive over
time, even before factoring in increased growth. We developed a
proposal that could be enacted in a simple, short bill designed to
accomplish the following:

analysis/Documents/OTA-T2011-04-Small-Business-Methodology-Aug-82011.pdf. For further discussion on small versus large businesses, see Kelly
Edmiston, The Role of Small and Large Business in Economic Development, 92
FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 73 (2007), available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/2q07edmi.pdf;
Matt
Lykken, How Important Is Small Business? Plumbers, Plutocrats and Tax
Reform,
YAHOO,
http://voices.yahoo.com/how-important-small-businessplumbers-plutocrats-8299053.html?cat=3 (last visited May 24, 2015); Alan D.
Viard & Amy Rodin, Big Business: The Other Engine of Economic Growth, AEI
TAX POL’Y OUTLOOK (2009), available at http://www.aei.org/article/politics-andpublic-opinion/judicial/big-business-the-other-engine-of-economic-growth/.
15. Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research Poll, Oct.
14,
2013
http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_289563/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=oZ9ZC7fI.
16. Standard and Poor’s is one of many economic analysts who have noted
that over-concentration of wealth is bad for economic growth and bad for
government revenues. See Joe Maguire, How Increasing Income Inequality Is
Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to Change the Tide,
S&P
RATINGSDIRECT
(Aug.
5,
2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/forum/Forum_2014/Income_Inequal
ity.pdf; Gabriel J. Petek, Income Inequality Weighs on State Tax Revenues,
S&P
RATINGS
DIRECT
(Sept.
15,
2014),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301747/s-amp-p-income-inequalityweighs-on-state-tax.pdf.
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1. To make the U.S.A. the most attractive location on
the planet for American companies to locate their
high-value operations, so that American workers
would regain market power;
2. To allow corporations to bring cash home to invest in
those high-value operations;
3. To enable American firms to compete effectively
against their foreign rivals;
4. To provide a benefit to middle-class workers who do
the right thing and save money for their children’s
educations and for retirement;
5. To avoid increasing the deficit today, and to provide
substantial additional revenues and private savings
in order to help prevent a fiscal crisis as the baby
boomers retire and the next generation is forced to
take on the burden of funding all those retirees;
6. To eliminate the incentive for corporations to take on
too much destabilizing debt by eliminating the tax
advantage of debt financing;
7. To improve the efficiency of our economy by
unlocking cash and encouraging its rapid flow to the
most efficient investments;
8. To put an end to corporate tax shenanigans and solve
the problem of corporate tax shelters and the
complexities of transfer pricing enforcement;
9. To put C corporations on the same basic tax footing
as pass-through entities, without double taxation of
corporate earnings, so as to eliminate tax distortion
of entity choice;
10. To
increase
corporate
responsiveness
to
shareholders and regulators;
11. To end the current general practice of compensating
corporate executives for artificial “growth” that
consists only of retaining earnings rather than
paying them out as dividends; and
12. To improve the efficiency of our allocation of talent
by eliminating the strong tax preference for pursuing
unproductive – and often destructive - speculation
rather than productive work, while at the same time
improving the perceived fairness of our tax system.

7

2015

IT’S NOT THAT DIFFICULT

925

In 2007, Laura Hunt17 and I published the first version of
the Shared Economic Growth proposal,18 with a modified
treatment in 2008.19 Those versions were powerful tools that
would accomplish every single one of the goals above, but they
contained revenue offsets that were highly unpopular with the
wealthy. The 2007 version included an unnecessarily large
additional tax on adjusted gross incomes above $500,000, while
the 2008 version still included repeal of the step-up in basis at
death, which is a tool that enables the moderately wealthy to
avoid ever having to pay income tax on a large share of their
income.20 We have learned that it does not pay to annoy the
wealthy more than necessary, so we further improved the
proposal by striking those parts and adding elements that would
be impossible to enact in any context other than as part of the
Shared Economic Growth framework, and at the same time
made the structure revenue-balanced even if American
corporations bring home every dollar they earn abroad.
Since those earlier publications, of course, some other things
have changed. The 2008 financial crisis and the economy’s
subsequent stubborn resistance to all-out stimulus proved that
our economic concerns were not merely alarmist.21 Congress has
17. While Laura and I published our earlier articles together, I am alone
on this one and so I wish to note that Laura has been a driving force behind
this proposal, but that the opinions expressed in this article are my own and
any errors are mine alone.
18. Matthew Lykken & Laura Hunt, Sharing Economic Growth, 114 TAX
NOTES 691 (2007).
19. Matthew Lykken & Laura Hunt, Shared Economic Growth: A
Proposal for Tax Reform, 118 TAX NOTES 1221 (2008).
20. Benjamin Franklin said that the only two certainties in life are death
and taxes, but this provision allows the one to eliminate the other. Now that
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 has implemented a $10MM estate
and gift tax exemption for a married couple (already increased to $10.5MM by
the inflation index, and subject to further increase from inherited Deceased
Spouse Unused Exemption amounts from another spouse), and with the
adoption of a 40% top estate and gift tax rate, most estate planning has now
shifted to holding onto appreciated assets until death to maximize the step-up.
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240 §302(a), 126 Stat.
2313 (2012).
21. Lack of market power continues to keep down wages, which in turn
suppresses overall growth in our demand-driven economy. Neil Shah,
Stagnant Wages Are Crimping Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323980604579028822725730
720.html?mod=WSJ_article_RecentColumns_TheOutlook.
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been calling loudly for tax reform, and a form of consensus
proposal for corporations has emerged, one that would be better
than the current system in some ways, but that does not go far
enough and that would create substantial problems.
Meanwhile, scholars and commentators on the left, right, and
center have been recognizing the value of various elements of
the Shared Economic Growth proposal and its theoretical
underpinnings.22
In this article, I outline the latest version of the proposal
and explain how it accomplishes all of the aforementioned goals,
with reference to some of the recent scholarly works that support
it. I then walk through the derivation of the numbers to show
that it really works, based on conservative assumptions and
without any reliance on economic growth or voodoo, and that it
would provide a substantial addition to revenue in the coming
years. These numbers are based on 2010 data, the most recent
comprehensive data available, and thus prove that the proposal
works in the post-2008 economy. I next compare the proposal to
the emerging “corporate consensus.” Finally, I walk through an
analysis of the propriety of certain offsets that can only work as
part of the Shared Economic Growth package.

22. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONGR., REP. ON PRESENT LAW
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM SUBMITTED TO THE TAX REFORM WORKING
GROUPS 498-501 (Joint Comm. Print 2013); Rosanne Altschuler et al., Capital
Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May

19, 2010), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=412093;
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, Corporate Tax Integration and
the Debt/Equity Distinction: The Case For Dividend Deduction, (Columbia Law
Sch.
Tax
Policy
Colloquium
2010),
available
at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/tax-policy/files/2010/
Avi-Yonah_Corporate%20Tax%20Integration_With%20Cover.pdf; Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., Cost of Capital Confusion, 118 TAX NOTES 1037 (2008); Megan
McArdle, Why We Should Eliminate the Corporate Income Tax, ATLANTIC (Oct.
28 2010, 2:16 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/10/whywe-should-eliminate-the-corporate-income-tax/65351/; Steven Rattner, End
Corporate Taxation, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2014, at A19; Eric Toder & Alan D.
Viard, Major Surgery Needed: A Call for Structural Reform of the U.S.
Corporate Income Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.aei.org/files/2014/04/03/-toder-viard-report_132524981261.pdf;
Matthew Yglesias, Scrap the Corporate Income Tax, SLATE (April 9, 2013, 11:52
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/04/corporate_
income_tax_reform_it_s_not_possible_we_should_just_get_rid_of.html.
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II. What Shared Economic Growth Is and How It Works
Simply, the proposal is to enact a corporate dividends-paid
deduction for distributions to shareholders not entitled to a
dividends-received deduction, capped at an amount that reduces
corporate tax otherwise payable to zero. The deduction could
only be used to offset corporate tax accruing after enactment.
Losses generated by the deduction could be carried forward and
back (but not to pre-enactment years) under the general rules of
I.R.C. § 172, so the deduction would not be “free” – if you wanted
to maximize the deduction and claim a financial accounting
benefit for it, you would have to pay earnings out as a dividend
within 2 years. The revenue cost of this change would be offset
by several items.
First, special tax rates for dividends received at the
individual level would be eliminated. The fundamental idea
behind the proposal is that corporate tax is eliminated through
a mechanism that collects the tax at the shareholder level if, as,
and when the corporate tax is reduced through the payment of a
dividend. (Other offsets are needed because a substantial
portion of dividends goes to shareholders who are not taxable or
who pay tax on a deferred basis.) So, task one is to ensure that
shareholders pay tax on the dividends at full ordinary rates.
Since the only justification given for allowing reduced rates on
dividends is to reduce the double taxation of corporate earnings,
this should not be controversial.
The ingenuity of tax planners being what it is, one would
expect that the above change would result in even more
dividends being replaced by stock buy-backs, so that the
shareholders could receive their distributions as capital gains.
Therefore, the second offset is to eliminate special capital gains
rates except for those on one’s own residence or on farm, timber,
livestock, or business personal property.23 It is necessary to the
proposal to eliminate capital gains rates for any form of direct or
indirect investment in stock, including interests in pass-through
23. The draft bill text, in the interest of simplicity, eliminates special
capital gains rates altogether, but I assume that Congress may find this
undesirable and so I have not included the relatively small benefit from
eliminating special rates for homeowners, rural operations, and nonspeculative business operations in the numbers here.
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entities that may own stock. I propose to go further and to
eliminate special rates for any form of financial asset,
speculative real estate, or interest in an entity (aside from small
business stock),24 on the grounds that it is inefficient to subsidize
speculation. Since the majority of capital gains benefits relate
to direct equity holdings, to capital gain distributions, and to
capital gain pass-through,25 however, special rates for other nonequity items could be preserved without fundamentally
undermining the proposal.
Since about 54% of taxable dividends go to families earning
over $250,000 per year,26 these offsets would be enough if it were
not for the fact that a large portion of the dividends of U.S.
companies flow either to foreigners or to U.S. tax-deferred
savings and pension accounts. As to the latter, Congress could
deal with the shortfall by imposing a withholding tax on
payments to such accounts. However, in light of the goals stated
above, I instead proposed to rebalance the burden a bit more
between high-income speculators and middle-class workers and
savers. In 2008, we proposed a supplemental 7.65% levy on
adjusted gross income in excess of $500,000. This subjects
persons at that income level to the same personal-side levy that
middle-class working people pay on every dollar of their wages
for Social Security and Medicare.27 We proposed that this 7.65%
24. I.R.C. § 1202 (2012). I have been told by a reliable source that the
Administration is particularly fond of this special benefit for a taxpayer’s first
$10,000,000 of gain on stock in a company with assets of less than $50,000,000,
which is understandably popular with venture capitalists and Hollywood.
25. Computed from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income.
See Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Tax Returns: Short-Term
and
Long-Term
Capital
Gains
and
Losses,
IRS
(2007),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Sales-of-Capital-Assets-Reported-onIndividual-Tax-Returns.
26. Computed from I.R.S. Statistics of Income 2010. See Individual
Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income: Sources of Income,
Adjustments Deductions and Exemptions, and Tax Items, IRS (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross
Income],
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-StatisticalTables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income.
27. Economists generally agree that the additional employer-side portion
of this levy also normally falls upon the worker in the form of lower pay, since
employers set pay levels based on their all-in cost of hire. See CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, AVERAGE FEDERAL
TAXES BY
INCOME
GROUP
(2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42870 (“The analysis assumes—as do the
analyses of most economists—that the employer’s share of payroll taxes is
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would be net of any amount already paid due to the lack of a cap
on Medicare wages, which did not make much difference because
high-income individuals tend to get their money from sources
other than wages or self-employment. Not coincidentally,
however, the federal government has since chosen to harvest
more of this revenue through the new 3.8% levy on unearned
income imposed as part of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act.28 We still propose that the 7.65% be a net
number, i.e., that it be 7.65% of AGI in excess of $500,000 less
any individual-side FICA tax or unearned-income levy on such
income, which substantially reduces the value of this offset.
Still, this is a particularly helpful offset because it would
automatically increase as dividend pay-outs increased, and thus
it helps to ensure that the proposal would be currently revenueneutral across a broad range of circumstances.
Now we come to an offset that is only possible within the
Shared Economic Growth framework. Currently, America
avoids imposing double taxation on the foreign income of our
corporations by allowing them a credit for the foreign tax they
paid, so if they earn $100 in the U.K. and pay $20 of U.K. tax,
they will get a credit of $20 against the $35 of U.S. tax that they
would otherwise owe on that income. Our treaties promise to
keep allowing such a credit.29 However, under Shared Economic
Growth corporations would not ever have to suffer double
taxation, because they would be entitled to reduce their U.S.
corporate income tax to zero merely by paying out their current
earnings as dividends.30 As I discuss further below, this
passed on to employees in the form of lower wages than would otherwise be
paid.”). Thus, these high-income individuals would still come out ahead of
normal workers. Id. Moreover, let us stop pretending that this levy is just an
insurance premium. The government has repeatedly added unfunded new
benefits to Medicare and costs have risen exponentially, so that the premiums
paid by any individual have little relationship to the cost of the benefits he or
she receives. Real insurance does not work that way.
28. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, §1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1061 (2010).
29. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION Art. 23 (2006) [hereinafter MODEL TAX CONVENTION], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf.
30. As discussed below, I also propose to allow corporations to currently
expense any investment in U.S. operating assets made out of post-enactment
earnings, so that they would only need to pay out un-reinvested earnings in
order to achieve zero taxation.
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provides an adequate justification for a general treaty override
to eliminate foreign tax credits for corporations and replace it
with a mere deduction.31 Corporations claimed $118,000,000,000
in foreign tax credits in 2010, so this change would provide a
$77,000,000,000
additional
offset,
being
65%
of
32
$118,000,000,000. Because it would both seriously offend our
trading partners and seriously damage our corporations to
eliminate the corporate foreign tax credit without otherwise
eliminating U.S. corporate tax on foreign income, only Shared
Economic Growth offers the opportunity to harvest this offset.
The elimination of the foreign tax credit would immunize
the proposal against any revenue shortfall from a decision by
American corporations to bring all of their foreign earnings
home. When a dollar of previously untaxed income hit their U.S.
tax returns by virtue of being distributed up from a foreign
subsidiary, it would attract thirty five cents of U.S. tax. The
corporation would have to pay out the full dollar in income to its
shareholders (or invest it in U.S. operations) in order to reduce
that tax to zero. The shareholder-level tax would then be some
seventeen cents, as computed below. Thus, the repatriation of
foreign earnings would only increase U.S. net tax revenue, and
indeed it is quite likely that this increase in revenue would be
triggered once corporations were able to repatriate their foreign
cash without a tax hit.
Finally, we need an offset to account for the fact that some
19% of U.S. equities are held, directly or indirectly, by foreign
persons, with some 20% of U.S. dividends going to foreigners.33
Here we propose a simple solution, and again an offset that
would only be possible as part of the Shared Economic Growth

31. See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text. The “corporate
consensus” proposal to move to territorial taxation would likewise require a
general treaty override to move from a foreign tax credit to a foreign income
exemption system, a change that other nations moving to an exemption system
have also made, so the mere need for such an override is not in itself that
radical. This is discussed further below.
32. See Statistics of Income: Returns of Active Corporations, Table 1, I.R.S.
(2010), at cell L12, http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/10co01ccr.xls
While corporations could eliminate this tax by paying additional dividends,
those incremental dividends would produce additional tax revenue. The
computations below are based on the all-in effect of these various items.
33. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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package. A 30%34 withholding tax, on top of any withholding tax
already imposed, would apply with respect to deductible
dividends (but not dividends in excess of the deduction limit)
paid to foreign persons not otherwise subject to U.S. income tax
on the dividends. This would be structured primarily as a
straight withholding tax with a treaty override, justified by the
fact that the gross dividend could be expected to be 54% higher
due to the allowance of the dividends-paid deduction, so the net
amount payable to the foreign shareholder would be unchanged
from current law. The propriety of this is discussed further
below, but in short the foreign shareholders would be as well-off
as they are today and would be entitled to choose to be taxed the
same way as a U.S.-resident shareholder, so they would have no
valid complaint.35
I would suggest one other component as part of the proposal,
though it would have a timing cost that could be offset by other
tweaks to corporate taxation. I would allow corporations to
expense all U.S. operating investments made out of postenactment earnings. This would maximize their incentive to
bring home the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries and invest
34. This number might need to be tweaked or made adjustable. The 2006
U.S. Model Treaty, Article 10, allows a 15% dividend withholding tax on
portfolio dividends, so under current law a typical portfolio investor would
receive $85 from a $100 dividend. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 29, at
art. 10. Since the payor corporation would receive a 35% benefit for paying the
dividend, the dividend would be expected to increase by 54%, since 1/(135%)=154%. A 30% withholding tax levy incremental to the current 15% tax
applied to a 54% higher dividend yields the same net $85 to the shareholder
and the same net revenue to the U.S. government. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED
STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 Art. 10 (2006),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/hp16802.pdf.
35. Some would try to argue that since the average effective tax rate on
U.S. corporations is lower than the 35% marginal rate, then foreign investors
would not expect to receive a full 54% more in dividends. However, it is a fact
that each dollar of dividends paid would save the corporation thirty-five cents,
so the corporation would be expected to gross its dividends up to 154% (i.e. by
1/(1-.35)) of the level they would otherwise be, but then stop when they ran out
of tax to offset. As the computations below indicate, generally companies will
have tax room to do the full gross-up on what they would otherwise pay.
Therefore, the fact that the overall effective rate on corporations is lower than
35% today would not, on average, prevent the 54% increase in dividends from
today’s levels, and in every case the overall value of the foreign shareholder’s
investment would be unchanged by the implementation of the proposal.
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them in new U.S. high-value operations. In essence, the cost of
this would be to postpone the collection of the seventeen cents
that the government would collect currently if a dollar of
investment was instead paid out as a dividend, with the deferral
occurring over the period that the investment would otherwise
have been depreciated, commonly anywhere between five and
fifteen years, with the average time outstanding being closer to
two to seven years.36 Having the government effectively lend a
corporation 17% of the cost of a high-value investment for two to
seven years seems like pretty cheap stimulus. This is especially
true given that the government could eliminate various other
corporate tax incentives/giveaways in order to offset this timing
effect if desired.
The reader will recall that 100% depreciation was chosen as
a stimulus tool after the 2008 crisis, without much noticeable
impact. Indeed, traditionally the main effect of accelerated
depreciation in our society is to stimulate individuals to claim
questionable deductions, not to stimulate genuine corporate
investment.37 This is because relatively few corporations run
investment economics that incorporate accurate tax timing in
their equipment purchasing decisions, so the temporary
accelerated benefit does not make its way into corporate decision
making. Further, after the 2008 crisis American corporations
mostly did not see any domestic investments that they wanted
to make, and instead sat on large piles of cash. With Shared
Economic Growth, on the other hand, expensing of operating
investments would enable corporate management to hang on to

36. Current law tends to front-load tax depreciation, so 50% of the
depreciation or amortization would be taken under current law by the two to
seven year mark. See I.R.C. § 168 (generally 200% declining balance recovery
is allowed with recovery periods that are generally accelerated, such that
property with a class life of 10 years has a 5-year recovery period and property
with a class life of 15 years has a 7-year recovery period, and property with a
class life of 25 years has a 15-year recovery period, so that more than half of
the depreciation on property with a 10-year class life is allowed after 2 years,
and more than half of the depreciation on property with a 25-year class life is
allowed after 7 years) and § 197 (15 year straight-line amortization for
acquired goodwill and going concern value).
37. See, e.g., Darryl Cohen & Jason Cummins, A Retrospective Evaluation
of the Effects of Temporary Partial Expensing (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series,
Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs Fed. Reserve Bd., Working
Paper No. 2006-19, 2006).
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earnings without having to convince the market to reinvest,
which would provide a potent practical incentive to make U.S.
operating investments.
Combined with a change in the
international tax provisions to make it more difficult to redeploy
foreign earnings cross-border,38 management could be forced
into a choice between investing foreign earnings in U.S.
operations or giving them to the shareholders and having to
convince investors to give them back. Managers, being what
they are, would strongly prefer the former choice. Because
Shared Economic Growth would make U.S. high-value
operations economically attractive, it would be easy to justify
such investments, so management would have the motive
(hanging on to earnings), the means (foreign cash) and the
opportunity (attractive American investments). Given the
various sources of increased income discussed below, providing
this investment incentive might not result in any overall current
loss of revenue, it certainly could not result in a long-term
revenue loss, and one would expect it to produce a substantial
revenue gain as those U.S. investments produced increased
wages and opportunities for American support businesses.
III. How Shared Economic Growth Accomplishes Its Goals
Shared Economic Growth would produce an extraordinary
number of benefits. Let’s look at each of the twelve in turn.
A. Making America the Most Attractive Location on the Planet
for American Companies to Locate Their High-Value
Operations, so That American Workers Would Regain
Market Power
This one is simple. The proposal would enable corporations
to reduce their effective U.S. tax rate to zero. No other developed
jurisdiction has a permanent zero corporate tax rate. This would
not cause all operations to come back to America. Low-margin
38. This could be done by repealing the I.R.C. § 954(c)(6) exception for
dividends from related controlled foreign corporations, and by enacting a
provision treating distributions from foreign entities treated as taxable
corporations under local law as dividends for purposes of § 954. See I.R.C. §
954(c)(6) (2012).
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operations that rely on low wages to make any profit would not
come here just to have a zero tax rate on their operating losses.
Those, however, are not the operations we want anyway. We
want high-margin operations that can afford to pay high wages.
Those operations are very tax sensitive. Consider the case of a
plant that today would earn $50,000,000 of taxable income in a
jurisdiction with a 25% tax rate, netting $37.5MM after tax. In
the U.S., it would net the full $50,000,000. If it currently paid
wages of $10,000,000, it could afford to more than double its
payroll and still be better off in the U.S. Even compared to the
12.5% Irish tax rate it would be much better off in the U.S. and
could still afford to increase its payroll by some 60% by moving
here. While some less-developed countries offer zero tax rates,
America would at least be equally good in terms of taxation, and
would offer advantages of market proximity and possibly
workforce education. In consequence, corporations would want
to have their operations here, and over time new operations
would be located here and many old operations would relocate.
These activities would need workers, increasing the demand side
of the curve and allowing workers to extract better pay and
working conditions.
Is it realistic to think that wages would rise? The economic
literature says yes. In an open economy such as ours, corporate
tax has a powerful effect on wages. As a European Union
economic study39 observed,
Another important distortion created by corporate
taxation is the one induced on labour markets.
This distortion is well-known in theory but is
generally absent from the political debate.
Economic theory shows that, under the
assumption of mobility of capital, the incidence of
the corporate tax is fully borne by labour (Gordon,
1986).40 Furthermore, this literature insists that
capital flight reduces labour productivity and, in
fine, wages. Hence, this creates an additional
39. Gaëtan Nicodème, Corporate Income Tax and Economic Distortions,
in TAXATION PAPERS, EUROPEAN UNION 8 (2008).
40. Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World
Economy, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1086 (1986).
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distortion which could be avoided if labour would
be taxed directly.
Recently, Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini
(2007)41 have investigated this issue using a panel
of more than 50,000 companies in nine European
countries over 1996-2003. Their results suggest a
validation of the theory as each additional euro of
corporate tax reduces wages by 92 eurocents in
the long-run. Therefore, the incidence of corporate
taxation falls almost entirely on labour.
A number of studies using a variety of data sets and
methodologies have agreed on the conclusion that the burden of
corporate tax falls heavily on labor,42 and that indeed a dollar
increase in corporate tax may reduce overall wages by four
dollars.43 The cost to workers can exceed the corporate tax
increase for two reasons. First, the mechanism is not corporate
managers insisting that employees accept wage reductions to
offset the corporate tax paid, because the employees are unlikely
to agree to that sort of negotiation. Rather, corporations react
to a high tax rate on their new investments by putting the
investments elsewhere, leaving employees in the market who
have no job at all and who will thus be willing to take whatever
wage they can get. Second, because multinational corporate jobs
are generally the high-paying jobs in our economy, when
corporate employees are forced to accept lower wages or are
thrown back into the market it reduces the price that both
41. Wiji Arulampalam et al., The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income
Tax on Wages (Inst. for Study of Labor (“IZA”) Discussion Paper Series,
Discussion Paper No. 5293, 2010).
42. See Matthew H. Jensen & Apama Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on
Labor: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 121 TAX NOTES 1083 (2011); William
M. Gentry, A Review of the Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporate Income
Tax (Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis Papers, Working Paper No.
101, 2007).
43. Bev Dahlby & Ergete Ferede, What Does It Cost to Raise a Dollar of
Revenue?: The Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 324 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT.
1-14 (2011), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary_324.pdf (a
Canadian study finding that provincial corporate tax rates produce an
economic burden of several times the corporate tax raised, an effect much
higher than personal income taxes or sales taxes).
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corporate and non-corporate workers can command. Labor rates
drop not just in the multinationals but in purely domestic
operations as well, due to the oversupply of workers.
This is important and the economists tend to miss it. They
cheerfully assume that “only” 100% of the burden of corporate
tax can fall on workers, because once labor rates drop low
enough to equal the differential corporate tax costs the
companies will, in the long run, move the jobs back (a dubious
assumption in itself, as discussed below). But assume that you
have a system with three employers, each with one employee,
Multinational Corporation, Hardware Hubert Ltd., and
Nonprofit Healthcare. All three workers make $20 an hour, and
represent 50% of the costs of their businesses, or $50X out of
$100X with Multinational Corporation earning a profit equal to
40% of its costs, i.e., $40X. Multinational Corporation could
move to Switzerland, still pay $20 an hour, and pay only 10% tax
rather than 35%. It demands that its U.S. employee reduce his
wages by enough to make up for the tax cost. The tax differential
is equal to 25% of the $40X profit, or $10X. The employee must
therefore accept a wage cut of 20%, i.e., $10X/$50X. So, 100% of
the corporate tax burden has been passed to labor. But now the
Multinational Corporation employee would be willing to jump to
either of the other two employers for any salary above his new
rate of $16 an hour. This competition causes the other two
employers to drop pay by 20% to $16.00 an hour. Labor now has
absorbed a cost equal to three times the differential corporate tax
burden, and that is an equilibrium rate that need never change.
Further, if the American workers somehow manage to reach a
new equilibrium at $16.01 per hour, so that Multinational
Corporation does move its operations abroad, actual U.S.
corporate tax collections will be zero. In other words, the burden
of corporate tax is not restricted to the amount of corporate tax
imposed, but rather is in theory connected to the amount of
corporate tax that would be imposed on operations that could be
located in America, many of which are not here partly due to our
corporate tax rate. This “scare away” burden tends not to be
accounted for in the models or in people’s intuitive assumptions.
Another counter-intuitive issue is that, somewhat weirdly,
and again because corporate jobs are the driver of good wages,
as corporate jobs decline as a share of our overall economy, the
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multiplier effect of reductions in corporate wages increases. If
corporate jobs are half of all jobs, which is roughly true today,
then employees can in principle bear a burden up to twice the
level of corporate tax, as illustrated by our simple model above.
If corporate jobs decline to a quarter of all jobs, then American
employees can bear a burden equal to up to four times the level
of corporate tax. As we chase corporate jobs abroad, then, we
become exposed to this strange multiplier, with the effect of
corporate tax becoming larger at the same time that corporate
employment becomes smaller as a share of the economy.
The other thing that the happy economists tend to discount
is the effect of friction on their pretty equilibriums. While they
recognize that location decisions are complicated and therefore
somewhat “inelastic” as to tax cost, they assume that if a $1
corporate tax differential drives a job abroad today, then if
workers accept a $1.01 decrease in compensation that job will
come back tomorrow. Corporate location decisions are more
complex than that. Companies do not love change, both because
it is risky and because they have sunk capital invested in the
status quo. They respond more freely to cost differentials for
new operations than for existing ones. When a differential
reaches a certain point, however, they become unable to resist
the impetus to respond and to move even their existing base.
Once they make that move abroad, they will be equally reluctant
to break the new status quo to move back, and will have to see
stable U.S. labor rates low enough in comparison to the foreign
rival to compel the move. “Equilibrium” then is really a range
with a width set by the level of friction, and once jobs locate
abroad we fall to the negative end of that range. Because
location decisions are subject to this sort of friction, we have not
yet felt the full potential burden of globalization on U.S. wages.
Once we break friction and the jobs move, though, we will feel
the full effect of both wage competition and tax competition. We
do not want to have our labor rates fall to the global common
denominator.
As corporations develop larger qualified labor pools and
better infrastructure abroad, one could reasonably expect that
the inelasticity of location decisions that economists recognize
will evaporate, leaving only the type of anti-change friction
described above. This will maximize the impact of the corporate
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tax differential. The foreign labor pool and infrastructure that
can support that disaster have been under development for some
time now, and the development is accelerating. Some statistics
regarding America’s ranking among its OECD peers for 2011 tell
the story:44
Percent of adults
degrees: 12th

achieving

post-secondary

Progress in post-secondary education from prior
generation: 35th
Percent of students completing upper secondary
education: 22nd
Employment rates among Tertiary A/graduate
school degree holders: 28th
Proportion of persons with less than upper
secondary education earning less than half the
median income (a high ranking indicates weak
market power for unskilled workers): 1st
Similarly, the 2009 PISA grade-school education rankings
place the U.S. 17th overall on the reading scale, and 22nd on the
Integrate and Interpret subscale of that score. We ranked 31st
in math and 23rd in science.45 The 2012-13 World Economic
Forum competitiveness report46 ranks the U.S. 7th in overall
competitiveness, 14th in infrastructure, 34th in health and
primary education, 8th in higher education and training, and 11th
in technological readiness. While in 2009 the United States
44. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2013:
OECD INDICATORS (2013).
45. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PISA 2009 RESULTS: WHAT
STUDENTS KNOW AND CAN DO: STUDENT PERFORMANCE IN READING,
MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE (VOLUME 1) (2010).
46. KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT
2012–2013
(2012),
available
at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_201213.pdf.
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awarded 26% of the OECD’s new PhD degrees in science and
engineering, China produced more (although of uncertain
quality),47 the number of U.S. PhDs per capita was only half the
rate for Switzerland,48 and the number of those U.S. degrees
being awarded to Americans has been declining. In 1995, 27%
of U.S. doctorate degrees were awarded to foreign visa holders.
In 2011 that had climbed to 36%, primarily from China,49 and
only 64% of those students stay here.50 Meanwhile American
native students are becoming increasingly disinclined to pursue
PhDs as various exploitative practices in academia (reduction in
stipends, longer time to degree and longer time as post-docs and
in non-tenure positions) adversely affects the economic benefit
of such a course of study.51 In 2011, China’s patent office
overtook the U.S. as the largest in the world, and Japan and
China both beat out the U.S. as originators of patents applied
for, while since 2008 China has beaten the U.S. in terms of
patent applications per R&D dollar spent and has an industrial
design registration count by residents that is an order of
magnitude larger than America’s. The cost of R&D operations
is nearly 13% less in the Netherlands than in the U.S., and
India, China and Russia are 57%, 46%, and 34% cheaper,
respectively.52 Prior to 2002, America had never run a trade
deficit in advanced technology products. Since then we have run
such a deficit every year, rising to $82 billion in 2010.53 America
ranks 44th out of 51 countries surveyed, behind Greece, the
47. David Cyranoski et al., The PhD Factory, 472 NATURE 276 (2011).
48. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY & INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2011L INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN
KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMIES
(2011),
available
at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_scoreboard-2011-12-en.
49. NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
WHO EARNS A U.S. DOCTORATE?
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sed/digest/2011/theme1.cfm#2 (last visited Apr.
23, 2015).
50. MICHAEL G. FINN, OAK RIDGE INST. FOR SCI. & EDUC., STAY RATES OF
FOREIGN DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS FROM U.S. UNIVERSITIES 2009 (2012).
51. Cyranoski et al., supra note 47.
52. KPMG,
COMPETITIVE
ALTERNATIVES:
KPMG’S
GUIDE
TO
INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
LOCATION
COSTS
(2014),
http://www.competitivealternatives.com/.
53. Derek Hill, U.S. Exports of Advanced Technology Products Declined
Less Than Other U.S. Exports in 2009, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STAT.
INFOBRIEF
(Sept.
2011),
available
at
www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf11307/nsf11307.pdf.
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Dominican Republic, and Belarus, in efficiency of healthcare and
3rd out of 51 in per-capita healthcare cost, and we make that an
employer’s problem by foisting an unusual amount of our
healthcare and pension costs onto the shoulders of employers. 54
In short, we are not in a position to think that our companies
have no viable alternative locations for manufacturing,
administration or research and development.55 This is like
climate change. We can see that something is happening, we
can see the rise of factors that logically would produce those
symptoms, and we know that at some point the buffers that have
kept things in bounds will collapse and that the changes will
accelerate beyond our control. If we wait until our economy is
gutted and our foreign-born college graduates all go home to
better opportunities, the next generation will not feel
sympathetic when we say, “oops . . . how were we to know this
would happen?”
Besides the burden that corporate taxation imposes on
American labor, economists are in general agreement that
corporate tax is the single worst tax in terms of reducing
economic growth. The only excuses for tolerating corporate tax
have been the potential effect on the overall fairness of the tax
system from reducing rates, and the problem of tax gaming by
wealthy individuals if they can benefit by shifting their income
into a corporate envelope. As the OECD stated in 2010:
Corporate income taxes are the most harmful for
growth as they discourage the activities of firms
that are most important for growth: investment in
capital and productivity improvements. In
addition, most corporate tax systems have a large
number of provisions that create tax advantages
for specific activities, typically drawing resources
away from the sectors in which they can make the
greatest contribution to growth. However,
54. Most
Efficient
Health
Care,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/most-efficient-healthcare-2014-countries (last visited May 24, 2015)
55. For a useful brief discussion of America’s decline, see David S. Mason,
The U.S. No Longer Makes the Grade: Economic Inequality Put an End to the
“American Century”, 92 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 4, 4-7 (2012).
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lowering the corporate tax rate substantially
below the top personal income tax rate can
jeopardize the integrity of the tax system as highincome individuals will attempt to shelter their
savings within corporations.56
The Shared Economic Growth proposal eliminates both of
the problems with eliminating corporate taxation, shifting the
tax burden in a manner that actually favors the working classes
and that reduces opportunities for individual tax avoidance. It
thus eliminates the worst tax in the best way.
B. Allowing Corporations to Bring Cash Home to Invest in
Those High-Value Operations
Under our current system, corporations generally pay a
heavy penalty for bringing their foreign-subsidiary earnings into
the U.S., whether to invest them in American operations or to
pay dividends. Most of the earnings of controlled subsidiaries
are subject to U.S. tax only when they are distributed to, or
invested in,57 the United States. They are then subject to a 35%
U.S. tax, with a credit for foreign taxes paid with respect to such
earnings.58 For earnings from zero-tax locations, the penalty is
a full 35%. So, if a dollar of zero-taxed earnings is invested in
any country other than our own, the corporation gets to invest
the full dollar, but if it invests it here it only gets to invest 65
cents. According to the most recent available IRS data on
controlled foreign corporations, for the year 2008, such CFCs
had foreign tax of $120B on pre-tax earnings of $854B, for a 14%

56. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES: TAX
POLICY
REFORM
AND
ECONOMIC
GROWTH
22
(2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264091085-en.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 956 (2012).
58. Id. §§ 11 & 902. The distribution is “grossed-up” by the amount of
credits allowed in order to prevent a double benefit. Id. § 78. A controlled
subsidiary with $100 of earnings that pays a 30% foreign tax will only have
$70 left to distribute. The foreign tax credit system seeks to ensure that the
original earnings will be taxed at a combined rate of 35%. The arithmetic only
works if you add the $30 back as a gross-up, apply U.S. tax to that total, and
then allow the $30 credit against the $35 U.S. tax.
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average foreign tax rate.59 On average, then, the U.S. tax
burden of bringing those earnings home would be 35%14%=21%. In practice it tends to be worse, since companies
selectively repatriate their higher-tax earnings on an ongoing
basis, leaving an even lower tax mix abroad. Thus, for 2008
U.S. parent corporations recognized CFC earnings with a
blended tax rate of some 30%,60 leaving behind earnings with an
associated tax credit of only 7.5%. Thus, the distribution of the
remaining 2008 earnings would have triggered a 27.5% residual
U.S. tax liability.61
Shared Economic Growth would take away this penalty for
bringing money to America. If the foreign cash was paid out as
a dividend to shareholders, the dividend deduction would fully
offset the U.S. tax on the dividend received from the foreign
subsidiary. If the cash was used to invest in U.S. operations, the
tax on repatriation would be fully offset by the expensed
deduction for the investment. Rather than saying “we will hit
you with a 27.5% liability if you bring any foreign cash into the
U.S.,” we would encourage corporations to bring home all the
cash they wanted and inject it into our economy.
Further, if corporations still proved reluctant to invest in
America (which would be hard to understand under the
improved tax structure), the Shared Economic Growth platform
would make it relatively easy to give them a little more incentive
by broadening the scope of subpart F,62 which subjects various
59. Computed from I.R.S. Statistics of Income 2008. See Statistics of
Income: U.S. Corporations and Their Controlled Foreign Corporations, IRS
(2008),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Controlled-ForeignCorporations (refer to tax information reported on Form 1118).
60. Id. (computed as H11/(H11+G11+C11)). Not coincidentally, the 5%
residual U.S. tax that these companies deemed tolerable is about equal to the
tax Congress imposed on the special “homeland” dividends under I.R.C. § 965
for 2005. Id. At much above that level, many companies start to gag. Id.
61. It is worth noting that the administration’s global foreign tax credit
pooling proposal would serve mainly to shut off the spigot on the tolerable
repatriation that corporations do today. If corporations were unable to
concentrate their foreign tax credits, they would be that much more reluctant
to bring home any foreign cash, and thus that much more desperate to find
foreign investments for their profits. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE
PROPOSALS
48
(2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf.
62. 26 U.S.C. § 951 (2012).
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forms of mobile income to current U.S. taxation. Broadening
subpart F today is problematic, because allowing the deferral of
U.S. tax is the only thing that allows American companies to be
remotely competitive with their foreign rivals, who are not taxed
on foreign income. Since Shared Economic Growth allows the
elimination of U.S. tax for companies that deploy their cash
properly, however, adoption of the proposal would allow
Congress more flexibility without unduly harming our
companies. Once foreign subsidiary income was subjected to
U.S. tax, that tax could only be relieved if the parent company
paid the cash out as a dividend or invested the cash in U.S.
operations within two years. I would recommend against doing
such a thing up front, since the proposal would enable and
encourage companies to fund all economically efficient U.S.
investments without the use of such strong-arm tactics, but it
would be an available option if companies did not otherwise
respond in an economically rational way.
C. Enabling American Firms to Compete Effectively Against
Their Foreign Rivals
Our current tax system is an awkward compromise
intended to make it possible for American companies to compete,
but it achieves this goal in a highly dysfunctional way. Every
OECD nation except ours now allows their corporations to earn
foreign operating income without paying significant homecountry tax. As one can see from the fact that, as shown above,63
American companies incur foreign tax at only an average
blended rate of 14%, there are many opportunities to earn
foreign income at very low rates, commonly ranging from 0% to
12.5%. Our competitors can bring these earnings home freely.64
What would happen if Congress decided to eliminate the
ability of our companies to defer U.S. tax on their foreign income
until they brought the cash home? Consider a profitable
company located in Singapore that is being taxed at an incentive
rate of zero. It is up for sale to the highest bidder. Say that it
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. On the other hand, for companies lucky enough to be based in a
country like Ireland or Switzerland, they can earn income in their home
country and only have it taxed at those rates.
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has a pre-tax present value of $100MM. A non-U.S. company
would be able to bid up to $100MM for it. An American company
would be able to bid only $65MM, because the 35% U.S. tax that
would then be imposed on the income would only leave a profit
stream with a present value of 65% of the pre-tax total.65 So, our
companies could not acquire subsidiaries.
Now say that an American company already owned the
Singapore operations, which would have a value of $65 in
American hands. It would be worth $100 in foreign hands, and
so a foreign rival could afford to buy it with no net tax friction.
In other words, a rival could pay $100 and the American seller
would receive $65 after tax, and so it would be easy to agree on
a sale without the buyer having to dream up the “synergies and
strategic value” that companies normally use to justify the value
loss that taxation imposes on a deal.
Finally, if both an American company and a foreign
company owned equivalent Singapore operations, the foreign
rival would be able to crush the American if it chose. Why?
Because the rival could drop prices until its pretax profit was
only 2/3 the level of the American company, and still make
enough money (i.e. as much as the American company, after tax)
so that the global equity markets would like its stock as much
as they liked the stock of the American company.
If our companies could not compete head-to-head, could not
buy assets, and could easily sell assets, it is clear that our
international operations would end up being liquidated.66
American companies would be unable to compete outside of the
U.S. market.
In high-technology industries requiring
substantial high-risk R&D, global scope is essential, because a
company that cannot spread that R&D cost across global sales

65. If
this
was
an
asset
purchase
with
an
average
depreciation/amortization period of ten years, the American bidder still could
not go above $78.85, due to time value of money effects.
66. It would not be difficult to find the buyers. China, for example, now
has 85 of the world’s top 500 corporations, compared to our 132, and is
aggressively pursuing global expansion subsidized by strong domestic
advantages. See KPMG, THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (MNCS): LOCAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2013), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Newslet
ters/China-360/Documents/China-360-Issue13-201310-emergence-of-ChineseMNCs-Local-and-global-implications.pdf.
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will not be able to keep up.67 In time, America would become a
low-tech backwater.
We allow the deferral of U.S. tax on foreign income in order
to avoid this scenario, but that mechanism is what makes it
prohibitively expensive for American companies to bring cash
home to make American investments. Many people argue68 that
if we cannot afford to eliminate deferral, then we should copy
our rivals and adopt “territorial taxation,” i.e., eliminate the
taxation of foreign earned income. That would be one approach,
and it would likely be better in practice than our current system
because it would eliminate the tax pressure to use cash abroad.
But still, it would leave foreign investment much more attractive
than U.S. investment. Shared Economic Growth, in contrast,
would allow us to make American companies competitive while
at the same time making our country a preferred location for
their most desirable operations.
D. Providing a Benefit to Middle-Class Workers Who Do the
Right Thing and Save Money for Their Children’s
Educations and for Retirement
Middle-class savers have been badly punished by the
government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. In the name
of stimulus, interest rates paid by banks have been forced down
to near zero. Whether or not this has actually stimulated the
economy, it has certainly served to boost bank spreads so that
67. This is an area where globalization must be given its due. Without
global markets, many product development projects would have to be
abandoned. This is simple arithmetic. R&D costs must be recouped from the
sale of products that use the resulting intellectual property, and if you can only
sell profitably in a fraction of the world’s markets, then you cannot invest in as
much R&D as you could if you were selling into the full global economy.
68. See H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, BUSINESS LEADERS IN SUPPORT
OF
A
TERRITORIAL
TAX
SYSTEM
(2011),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Intl_quotes.pdf; Territorial vs.
Worldwide
Taxation, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. PAPER,
http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/territorial-vs-worldwide-taxation;
Mihir A. Desai et al., Repatriation Taxes and Dividend Distortions, 54 NAT’L
TAX J. 829, 851 (2001); Summary of Staff Discussion Draft: International
Business Tax Reform, CHAIRMAN MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's%20Staff%20Intern
ational%20Discussion%20Draft%20Summary.pdf.
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they could have enough profit to slowly and quietly burn off their
toxic asset holdings, a hidden $278 billion annual “tax” on
household depositors.69 According to Federal Reserve data,70
average 6-month CD rates in 2007 were 5.24% while average
conventional mortgage rates in that year were 6.34%, a 21%
spread. In 2012, the CD rates had dropped to 0.44% while
mortgage rates were 3.66%, a 732% spread. Nice for the banks,
tragic for depositors. In the meantime, of course, savers saw the
stock market collapse in 2008 and remain volatile thereafter.
Middle-class parents saving for college or retirement or to try to
build a cushion against lay-offs find themselves earning dismal
returns, while retirees who thought they had saved enough to
provide a reasonable income find that they were sadly mistaken.
Meanwhile, the government has gotten caught in a trap. In
2009, federally chartered depositary institutions held $124.5B
in treasury securities and $1,417.4B in Agency and Government
Sponsored Entity backed securities. In 2012, these figures were
$243.2B and $1,669.7B, respectively, a 24% increase.71 In the
same time period the total assets of such depositary institutions
increased only 7%. In short, the banks own a lot of government
or government-backed bonds, and if interest rates rise
significantly the value of those bonds will drop. If interest rates
doubled, the banks could lose 3% of their total assets, plus
another 7% or so considering the effects on the value of their
69. This figure is computed from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data
(level table L100) showing total household deposits of $9,997.8 billion for 2012,
and using interest rates from Bank of America’s 2012 and 2007 annual reports.
B of A paid depositors an average interest rate of 3.03% in 2007, but only 0.25%
in 2012. This one bank would have paid depositors an extra $17.4 billion in
2012 if interest rates were still at their normal 2007 level. Applying the same
spread to total deposits yields the $278 billion total cost to responsible holders
of bank savings accounts. It is also interesting to note that Bank of America
would have earned $9 billion more on mortgages in 2012 if mortgage interest
rates were still at the levels B of A received in 2007, but B of A’s reported 2012
average interest rate on mortgages is computed after making allowances for
non-performing mortgages held by B of A, so some of that $9 billion is due to
them being caught with bad mortgages and bleeding off the cost.
70. For the average annual six-month certificate of deposit rates and
conventional mortgage rates, see Selected Interest Rates (Daily) – H.15, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last updated Dec. 19,
2013) (referring to six-month negotiable certificates of deposits in secondary
market, quoted on an investment basis).
71. See Federal Reserve Flow of Funds chart L.110.

29

2015

IT’S NOT THAT DIFFICULT

947

$3,997B in mortgage holdings. While the Federal Reserve has
decided to hold all of its bonds to maturity so that it will never
need to admit to the losses it will suffer on them,72 the banks are
subject to different accounting rules and so (being a creature of
the banks that own it) the Fed will conduct the taper in such a
way that banks can slowly dispose of these bond and mortgage
losses against the extraordinary profits they make at the
expense of depositors. Depositors should thus not count on
government efforts to raise the returns on their deposits to
normal levels any time soon.
However, the middle class does own a significant amount of
stock, directly or indirectly. According to the Federal Reserve’s
2010 Survey of Consumer Finance, the lower 90% of the
population holds some 26% of direct equity, 28% of mutual
funds, 57% of insurance company annuities, and 45% of IRAs
and 401(k)s.73 According to the 2010 IRS Statistics of Income
tables,74 families earning under $100,000 a year received 59% of
all pension and annuity income. Since defined-benefit plans own
some $3.5 trillion of equity,75 the stability of defined-benefit
plans depends on equity values, which is a significant
consideration given that many pension plans are stressed.76
72. The Fed is not required to account for market-to-market losses, so if it
holds the bonds to maturity, it will never record a loss when it will receive the
face-value principle. See Robert Lenzner, The Federal Reserve Will Lose
Billions but It Just Doesn’t Matter, FORBES.COM (June 6, 2013), http://
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/06/08/the-federal-reservewill-lose-billions-but-it-just-doesnt-matter/. The Fed will continue to recognize
interest income that can be used to reduce the acknowledged federal deficit,
but in a lower amount than if the Fed held bonds that would continue to pay
out at market interest rates.
73. FED. RESERVE BD., BEFORE-TAX FAMILY INCOME, PERCENTAGE OF
FAMILIES THAT SAVED, AND DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES, BY SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES, 1989–1998 SURVEYS (2010), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/wealth_income.pdf.
74. See Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income,
supra note 26.
75. See Statistics of Income: U.S. Corporations and Their Controlled
Foreign Corporations: Number, Assets, Receipts, Earnings, Taxes,
Distributions, Subpart F Income, and Related Party Transactions, IRS (2008),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Controlled-Foreign-Corporations
[hereinafter I.R.S. Statistics of Income] (referring to Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds charts L.213 lines 16 and 17, L.116b lines 12 and 13, L.117 line 14, and
L.118).
76. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE UNDERFUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL
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As the above statistics indicate, middle-class equity
holdings are skewed towards tax-deferred vehicles such as IRAs,
401(k)s, annuities and pensions. Upon the enactment of Shared
Economic Growth, equity values would climb to some extent due
to the enhancement of the future corporate earnings stream.
The extent of this value bump would depend on Wall Street
emotions, as the well-to-do traders would not see their net aftertax income from shareholdings jump. More reliably, though,
middle-class holders would see a large stream of dividends.
Where today the relationship between corporate earnings and
share prices is largely mysterious, so that ordinary shareholders
can lose money over a period when earnings are doing relatively
well, in a Shared Economic Growth world good earnings would
translate fairly directly into cash in the pocket (or IRA) of the
shareholder. Long-term holders of companies that make reliably
good profits could be confident of good returns, freed from the
vagaries of Wall Street gamesmanship.
Moreover, Shared Economic Growth would directly boost
those distributable earnings. A company that paid a $100
dividend today would be able to boost it to $154 after enactment,
because it would receive a 35% tax benefit by paying the
dividend. Middle-class investors would be pleased to receive a
54% boost in their tax-deferred earnings, I suspect.77 This grossup would apply to all dividends “paid for” by Shared Economic
Growth. To take an example based on 2010 numbers, the
maximum deductible dividends amount for 2010 would be the
total corporate tax, adjusted for the proposed elimination of
foreign tax credits, of $299.7B divided by 35%, or $856B in
dividends. If corporations had otherwise chosen to pay out
$556B in dividends, they would now be able to pay out $856B,
54% more, and have the same retained earnings remaining after
the dividend payments. In fact corporations paid $554B out of
$1,356B in net earnings before taxes, leaving them with retained
earnings of some $579B after tax. Under the proposal their
PENSION PLANS (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/22042.
77. It should be noted that the maximum average increase in the value of
U.S. corporations would be capped at about 36%, rather than 54%, because the
average corporate effective rate for 2010, after backing out NOL carryforwards
that were largely a hangover from 2008 and not counting foreign tax credits,
was some 26.3% rather than the 35% marginal rate. See Individual Statistical
Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, supra note 26.
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retained earnings would drop by $77B whether or not they paid
dividends, due to the change in foreign tax credits. That change
aside, they would have been able to pay an extra $302B in
dividends and still have ended up with the same net earnings of
$502B. Hypothetically, if they had otherwise paid more than
$556B in dividends pre-change, then Shared Economic Growth
would not enable a 54% increase on the excess dividends they
actually paid, but it still would be a 54% increase on the part of
those dividends “paid for” by the dividends-paid deduction. The
remaining excess dividends in this hypothetical scenario would
not have been deductible before and would not be deductible
under the proposal, either, so it need not concern us here.78
Thus, Shared Economic Growth would improve the stability
of the investments of the middle class, help to insulate them
against Wall Street skimming,79 and give them a 54% taxdeferred bonus. That extra money in the hands of retirees and
would-be college students would, in turn, result in spending that
would help to stimulate the economy the old fashioned way,
through real income in the hands of middle-class consumers.80
E. Avoiding Increasing the Deficit Today, and Providing
Substantial Additional Revenues and Private Savings in
Order to Prevent a Fiscal Crisis as the Baby Boomers Retire
and the Next Generation Is Forced to Take on the Burden of
Funding All Those Retirees
The computations below walk through the components by
which Shared Economic Growth achieves current tax neutrality.
78. The shareholder-level current tax revenue per dollar of non-deductible
dividend would be about twelve cents under the proposal as compared with
about seven cents today, so any such hypothetical excess would produce a
revenue benefit if it persisted.
79. High-speed trading, arbitraging of the share price versus asset value
of Exchange Trade Funds (“ETFs”) by large investors, and other assorted
games provide fruitful opportunities for Wall Street to divert the value that
should logically flow to shareholders from corporate earnings.
80. Lack of middle-class purchasing power is a major drain on our
economy, hurting everyone including the wealthy. See J. Bradford Delong, The
Strange Case of American Inequality, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/j--bradford-delong-asks-whyamericans-are-not-clamoring-for-polices-that-would-leave-90--of-them-betteroff.
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Here, I will focus further on one aspect of those computations,
which shows that one could conservatively expect the proposal
to fund an extra $22 billion in federal revenues and $145 billion
in private retirement draws per year as the baby boomers move
through retirement.
Part of what makes achieving tax
neutrality tricky is that a large portion of U.S. equity is held
under tax-deferred arrangements. In 2010, only 32% of
dividends received by U.S. persons (excluding intra-group
dividends) were reported on individual returns, $187B out of
$586B. About 5% of such dividends go to non-taxable sources
such as non-profits and governments. This apparently leaves
some 63% going to tax deferred vehicles.81
As of 2007, only some 8.3% of total IRA assets were in Roth
IRAs, though Roths tended to have a somewhat higher
percentage of their assets invested in equities.82 So, say that
10% of IRA-held equities are in Roth form, and make an
unrealistically conservative83 assumption as to the percentage of
dividends flowing to IRAs, i.e., assume that anything not
definitely held in another way is held through an IRA. This
yields a percentage of tax-deferred assets in Roths of 4.3%.

81. It is not clear why this number is quite so high, or indeed whether it
actually is that high or if some $95 billion of taxable dividend income is hidden
under other tax lines. Judging from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, one
would anticipate more like 48% going to tax-deferred holders and 47% to
taxable households, based on their relative apparent shares of equity
ownership. However, the Federal Reserve data necessarily uses various
simplifying assumptions to categorize things, so it may be misleading in this
respect as well as lacking in certain potentially useful details. For example,
the way that the Federal Reserve handles Exchange Traded Funds or flowthrough business entities may obscure a sizeable set of dividend flows that are
currently taxable. Further, it may be that investors preferentially skew highdividend equities to their tax-deferred accounts. In any event, I have given
priority to the IRS data on the grounds that it is the most conservative in terms
of making it difficult to offset the cost of the dividends-paid deduction. My best
guess is that the proposal would in fact generate substantial excess revenue on
a current basis. As discussed below, this could add some $32 billion per year of
revenue under the proposal if the Flow of Funds data presents an accurate
picture.
82. Craig Copeland, Individual Account Retirement Plans: An Analysis of
the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, with Market Adjustments to June 2009,
333 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. BRIEF, Aug. 2009, at 27 (2009).
83. The Federal Reserve and Employee Benefit Research Institute data
suggest that the total cannot actually be that high. See EBRI DATABOOK ON
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, http://www.ebri.org/publications/books/?fa=databook.
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Round that up to 5%, and you still have 58% of dividends going
into retirement arrangements but eventually coming back out
and being taxed.
Another source of potential slippage is equities held by
defined-benefit retirement plans. Dividends going to such plans
do not directly increase taxable pensions. However, they can be
expected to generate taxable income in one of several ways.
First, by preventing the partial or total failure of such plans
(think Detroit), they may increase actual payments to
pensioners.84 Second, by reducing the additional contributions
that employers need to make, they may increase employer
earnings and thus either be taxable directly (if non-corporate) or
by increasing taxable dividends (if corporate). Third, by
reducing the burden on state and local governments to make
good on their pension commitments, such dividends may reduce
the federal deduction for state and local taxes or reduce the
amount that the federal government is called upon to share in
order to bail out the states.85 Overall, then, it would appear that
increased dividends flowing to defined benefit plans would
provide increased revenue or decreased expense through one
channel or another. Still, let’s be hyper-conservative and take a
worst-case scenario, assuming that dividends paid on equities
held by state, local and federal pension plans produce no benefit.
This would make up to 11% of dividends non-taxable on top of
the 5% going to Roth IRAs. So, now we have 48% of dividends
being truly tax deferred.
What does that mean in dollar terms? Based on 2010
numbers, Shared Economic Growth would push corporations to
84. Many private defined-benefit plans have run into trouble similar to
their local-government counterparts, with companies making workers happy
by promising future benefits that they lacked money to pay. PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORP., HELPING SECURE RETIREMENTS PBGC ANNUAL REPORT (2013),
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf.
The
existing pension safety net, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, is
running a record deficit of $35.7 billion, or 31% of the liabilities it has already
assumed. Id. Shared Economic Growth would help to stabilize both the private
plans and the PBGC. Id.
85. As of June 30, 2013, some 35% of the assets of state and local
government pensions consisted of stocks. See QUARTERLY SURVEY OF PUBLIC
PENSIONS: CASH AND SECURITY HOLDINGS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING JUNE 30,
2013 AND PRIOR QUARTERS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), available at
http://www2.census.gov/govs/qpr/2013/2013q2.pdf.
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pay additional dividends of $311 billion, before consideration of
additional amounts parked under foreign subsidiaries that could
be liberated, so 48% of this is $149 billion of dividends going to
tax-deferred retirement accounts.
Based on the 2010
distribution of IRA and taxable pension receipts, these amounts
would ultimately produce tax revenue of 15% of the dividend
amount, or $22 billion per year.
The timing of this revenue would coincide with the timing
of baby boomer retirement draws. So, under Shared Economic
Growth we would be putting $149 billion of dividends per year
into the hands of retirees and $22 billion per year into the hands
of the federal government. Since this will be the period when
the government is desperately trying to figure out how to repay
the Social Security “trust fund,” every cent of which was spent
long ago, this money would undoubtedly come in handy.
F.

Eliminating the Incentive for Corporations to Take on Too
Much Destabilizing Debt by Eliminating the Tax Advantage
of Debt Financing

Our current tax system creates a distortion in favor of
excessive borrowing by providing a deduction for interest
payments but not for dividends. While it is difficult to quantify
the social welfare costs of this distortion, they are likely
significant.86 The significance of this distortion increases when
a nation becomes vulnerable to economic shocks, as excessive
leverage tends to deepen and extend the effect of the shock.87 As
we saw in 2008, the American economy has become susceptible
to such shocks, and in its weakened condition our economy will
remain so for the foreseeable future.
There are two ways to eliminate this distortion – either
eliminate the deduction for debt, or provide an equivalent

86. See RUUD A. DE MOOIJ, INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX BIASES TO DEBT
FINANCE: ASSESSING THE PROBLEM, FINDING SOLUTIONS 12-14 (2011), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1111.pdf.
87. See Javier Bianchi, Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the
Business Cycle, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 3400 (2011); see also Se-Jik Kim & Mark
R. Stone, Corporate Leverage, Bankruptcy, and Output Adjustment in PostCrisis East Asia (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/99/143, 1999),
available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99143.pdf.
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deduction for equity. While several countries have expressed a
desire to reduce the deduction for debt out of concern over its
destabilizing effect, they have tended towards partial measures
due to the difficulties involved in completely eliminating the
deduction without unduly reducing investment.88
Other countries, such as Belgium, have allowed a deduction
based on a statutory rate factor applied to equity levels. This
reduction in corporate tax comes with a fiscal cost that can only
be overcome if the deduction stimulates adequate growth in
taxable profits. In contrast, Shared Economic Growth, by
allowing a deduction for dividends paid, would eliminate the tax
bias in favor of debt in a manner that collects a full revenue
offset at the shareholder level.
The proposal would also eliminate another significant
driver of U.S. corporate debt. Because American corporations
cannot bring the bulk of their foreign earnings home without an
unacceptable tax cost, they sit on foreign cash while incurring
large U.S. debts in order to make investments, pay dividends or
do stock buy-backs.89 Because drawing upon their foreign cash
to cover their debts would trigger a very large tax hit, their U.S.
debt is destabilizing to the economy even though they may have
enough foreign cash to pay it off. Moreover, they are soaking up
our economy’s lending capacity for fundamentally unproductive
uses. Under Shared Economic Growth, they would be able to use
a combination of U.S. earnings and foreign cash to pay dividends
while using foreign cash to make additional U.S. operating
investments.
On the other hand, they would be somewhat discouraged
from incurring further U.S. debt because the tax-efficient
payment of debt principal would need to come from a limited and
88. DE MOOIJ, supra note 86, at 14.
89. For example, Microsoft’s December 31, 2012 balance sheet shows $68
billion of cash and short-term investments at the same time that they have $12
billion of long-term debt and $8 billion of “other long-term liabilities.” 2012
ANNUAL
REPORT,
MICROSOFT
CORP.
(2012),
available
at
http://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar12/index.html. Apple’s December
29, 2012 balance sheet shows $40 billion in cash and marketable securities, as
well as $19 billion in long-term liabilities. QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, APPLE INC.
(2012)
[hereinafter
QUARTERLY
REPORT],
available
at
http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-1322339&CIK=320193.
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shrinking pool of funds. Since repatriated foreign earnings
would trigger U.S. tax unless they were paid out as dividends or
invested in operations, and since U.S. taxable income would also
need to be paid out as dividends unless it was reinvested in
operations, the only cash left over to pay debt principal would be
cash income sheltered by non-cash tax deductions or credits.
Those deductions would consist primarily of burning off the
depreciation on pre-enactment investments90 or by special
deductions or general business credits. From the moment of
enactment, then, corporations would have incentive to plan to
reduce their outstanding debt. If they wished to borrow for new
operating investments, of course, they could still do so, since the
cash proceeds of the new borrowing, invested in deductible
expenditures, would free the company to retain other operating
income to repay the debt later. Borrowing to pay dividends, to
do stock buy-backs, or to take other actions that do not produce
a deduction, however, would be unwise going forward. Thus,
U.S. credit would be freed up to support useful investments
rather than being tapped to support keeping cash deployed in
other countries.
The proposal would also address another destabilizing bias
in our current system. Today, stock analysts tend to focus on
growth in financial earnings per share (“EPS”). There are
various ways to achieve such growth that do not involve making
more money, as such. Stock buy-backs, by reducing shares
outstanding, boost EPS. High leverage at today’s low interest
rates also boosts EPS. Slashing investment boosts EPS in the
short run, even if it causes management to sit on idle cash and
to decline profitable investments, and the market lives in the
short run. Accounting gimmicks can increase EPS until they
collapse. Shared Economic Growth could be expected to shift the
focus onto sustainable cash yield, i.e., actually making money,
while at the same time giving management incentive to find
ongoing U.S. operational investments so that they could hold on
to more of their cash while still achieving a zero tax rate. While
the proposal would be unlikely to cure our addiction to EPS
90. Apple shows some $20 billion in financial book depreciable and
amortizable assets. It seems likely that most companies would be able to pay
off their debt from this source in a tax-efficient manner if they plan for it.
QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 89.
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growth at all costs, it should help to partially tame that tiger.
G. Improving the Efficiency of Our Economy by Unlocking Cash
and Encouraging Its Rapid Flow to the Most Efficient
Investments
American corporations are sitting on a record amount of
cash. As noted above, many are sitting on cash at the same time
that they are piling up domestic debt. Economists have
investigated the reasons why companies do this.
Not
surprisingly, they have found that a major reason is the current
tax penalty for bringing foreign cash home.91 The additional
explanation is that corporate management likes to have cash so
that they do not have to ask for it from investors or lenders.92
Economists like to try to figure things out from statistics
rather than by asking the people who know. As one of the people
who used to be in a position to know, I can tell you that they are
correct, and that other suggestions that have been made are
largely erroneous. It is possible to see various false correlations
in abstract data. For example, it has been noted that cash
hoarding tends to be most pronounced among R&D-intensive
industries, and it has been suggested that this is because R&D
is risky so the cash provides a needed cushion.93 While that may
be true for start-ups, who burn through cash, for established
corporations the correlation is not in itself explanatory. Rather,
companies that make their money using technology have an
easier time arranging their affairs to put valuable assets, risks
and activities in low-tax locations, so they accumulate large
amounts of low-tax foreign cash. As noted above, efforts by the
U.S. government to interfere with this type of structuring have
perversely just served to reinforce it, forcing corporations to
91. See C. Fritz Foley et al., Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A TaxBased Explanation 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12649, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12649.pdf; see also
Juan M. Sanchez & Emircan Yurdagul, Why Are Corporations Holding so
Much
Cash?,
THE
REG’L
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=2314.
92. See Foley et al., supra note 91, at 2.
93. Id. at 7-8. Other studies have also made this connection, e.g. Mortin
Kamien and Nancy Schwartz, Self-Financing of an R&D Project, AM. ECON.
REV. 68, 252-61 (1978).
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move ever-increasing amounts of valuable substance and jobs
abroad. Both the structuring and the cash hoarding will
continue until we remove the incentives that drive them.
The problem with cash hoarding, whether driven by tax or
by management not wanting to have to persuade investors and
lenders to provide new money, is that it keeps cash from flowing
to its highest and best use in the economy. A corporation can
only apply cash to the best investment available to it,
considering its organizational limitations. While investors have
been remarkably willing to give Google a gigantic fund of cash
and to allow its management to try to find amusing and
profitable things to do with it, stock analysts and
commentators94 normally suspect that corporations with too
much cash will end up spending it on something foolish, and
research indicates that they are correct in that suspicion.95 Even
the best corporate managers can only use their money to pursue
opportunities that the talents and assets of their organization
can handle. If the overall highest and best use of the money
would be in an opportunity more suitable to a different
organization, then societal value is destroyed by the fact that the
cash is locked inside the generating corporation. If we have any
real faith in the wisdom of the markets, then we should always
seek to liberate excess cash and allow the market to deploy it to
where it will do the most good.
Further, there are times such as in 2009 when the market
believes that operating investment opportunities are limited
because existing production capacity is underutilized, and that
what we really need is more consumer demand in order to
increase efficient utilization of that existing capacity. In 2009,
corporations idled an enormous pile of cash. If, instead, some of
that cash had been placed in the hands of middle-class
consumers, they would have spent it, increasing demand and
94. E.g., Ben McClure, Cash: Can a Company Have Too Much?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/062503.asp (last visited
Apr. 26, 2015).
95. On average, corporate acquisitions destroy value, to the tune of $218
billion between 1980 and 2001. See Sara B. Moeller et al., Do Shareholders of
Acquiring Firms Gain From Acquisitions? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
9523,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9523.
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giving the economy what it needed. In short, accelerating the
circulation of cash by promoting dividends not only allows funds
to flow to the best available investment, it allows them to flow to
the correct balance between investment and consumption.
This point negates an argument sometimes raised against
the significance of corporate cash hoarding. Corporations do not,
of course, put their cash under a mattress. They deposit it
somewhere or buy liquid securities. We rely on banks to then
make those funds available for other investments. But banks do
not lend to consumers to buy groceries or clothes (save by credit
card debt at 20% interest). They do not lend to risky start-up
companies. They do not lend to innovative ventures that may
solicit capital from crowd-sourced outlets. In short, having
banks redeploy capital is not equivalent to putting cash into the
hands of people and letting them make judgments on what to do
with it. Bank intermediation does not prevent cash hoarding
from being economically inefficient.
Again, Shared Economic Growth addresses the foreign cash
problem by allowing companies to bring cash home freely for
dividends and domestic investment. Further, it provides a
platform to enable congress to push companies to do so if they do
not seem to avail themselves of the opportunity at an
appropriate level due to management’s fondness for cash
hoarding.96
As to managers engaging in cash hoarding just to protect
themselves from having to satisfy investors or in order to boost
their personal power and status, Shared Economic Growth
would effectively force the pay-out of taxable income or impose a
35% tax penalty for failure to do so. Based on 2010 numbers,
this would have forced the payout of 63% of corporate net
income. This level of payout is not particularly radical, leaving
companies with an average of 37% of their pre-tax earnings as
opposed to the 43% they actually retained after tax in 2010. This
payout level is especially safe given that management would not
96. Again, I would counsel against actively pushing foreign repatriation
in the first instance, as opposed to merely removing obstacles to it. Moving
money around in the international context can be difficult and costly, and
corporations should have room to make efficient decisions. However, if future
monitoring strongly suggests that managers are simply engaged in inefficient
hoarding, building up passive assets rather than making profitable
investments, then Congress could apply the cattle prod to get things moving.
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have to pay out any dollar of earnings that they reinvested in
domestic operations, so the proposal would not deprive them of
any cash they needed for operations. Over time, if Congress felt
it advisable to increase the payout ratio, they would only need to
reduce existing corporate tax subsidies, such as repealing the
domestic production activities deduction under I.R.C. § 199 as to
corporations ($24 billion in 201097). Under the proposal, this
would not increase tax on the corporation, but rather would just
require companies to pay out a higher percentage of their nonreinvested earnings in order to achieve zero U.S. tax. Such
changes would also increase net federal revenue by 17 cents for
each dollar of corporate deduction eliminated. Shared Economic
Growth would enable a truly fundamental improvement in the
efficiency by which cash is pushed towards its highest and best
use in our society, but it would do so in a way that allows the
government to be gentle and cautious so as to avoid any
unforeseen negative disruptions.
H. Putting an End to Corporate Tax Shenanigans and Solving
the Problem of Tax Shelters and the Complexities of Transfer
Pricing Enforcement
Imagine having anywhere between two and five or more IRS
auditors sitting in your office every working day of the year,
including economists who analyze every purchase, sale or other
transfer you make based on a complete electronic download of
all your financial records. This is what large American
corporations live with. Further, these auditors and specialists
are at the top of the IRS pay scale, generally bright people who
know what they are looking at. They read the Board minutes,
interview executives, travel to foreign locations, and for
taxpayers in the Compliance Assurance Process they receive
detailed explanations of all significant transactions in real time,
in the quarter the transaction is completed, and get to quiz the
company to their heart’s content. Despite all of this, the
government and commentators remain highly concerned that
corporations may be managing to avoid paying the appropriate
97. See Returns of Active Corporations, Form 1120: Table 16, Balance
Sheet, Income Statement, Tax, and Selected Other Items, by Major Industry Tax
Year 2010, IRS (2010), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10co16ccr.xls (refer to cell b77).
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amount of tax.98 If the government can put as much effort as it
does into corporate tax administration and yet still feel that it is
failing, then the current system is simply not administrable.
When you already have senior people looking over a company’s
shoulder at every transaction every day with full power to obtain
any information they want world-wide, there is really nothing
more that you can do except to change the system.
Various sorts of proposals have been put forward to address
what is perceived as inappropriate tax reduction by
corporations.99 Many of these proposals would undermine the
competitive position of American corporations relative to their
foreign rivals. As has been discussed above, doing things like
repealing the deferral of U.S. tax on foreign subsidiary income
would in due course utterly destroy our companies,100 including
both their valuable U.S. headquarters jobs and, in time, their
remaining U.S. manufacturing operations. Interfering with the
use of corporate tax credits would further inhibit bringing cash
home. Attempting to put further controls over the sharing of
intangible assets or the already extremely complex realm of
transfer pricing would chase more high-value jobs abroad, since
it is now reasonably easy to find competent foreign researchers
and to just develop everything abroad if that is what it takes to
avoid a 35% tax hit. Efforts to shut down corporate tax shelters,
meanwhile, have proven to be a game of whack-a-mole, with
ingenious planners and financial industry operatives creating
new opportunities as old ones come under restriction. We need
a better plan.
Under Shared Economic Growth corporate tax shelters
would become irrelevant and unwise. If successful, such shelter
schemes would serve only to increase the amount of cash a

98. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance
and
Evasion,
CONG.
RES.
SERVICE
1
(Jan.
15,
2015),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf; Michael McDonald, Income Shifting
from Transfer Pricing: Further Evidence from Tax Return Data (Dep’t of
Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper 2, July 2008), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/taxanalysis/documents/otatech02.pdf.
99. Gravelle, supra note 98, at 24-29 (offers a partial listing).
100. This can happen with startling speed, as was seen in the shipping
industry. See Kenneth Kies, A Perfect Experiment: Deferral and the U.S.
Shipping Industry, 114 TAX NOTES 997 (2007).
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corporation could keep from its shareholders, rather than
serving to reduce tax expense. If unsuccessful, a typical shelter
would fail and be unwound more than two years out, too late to
reduce the resulting tax by carrying back losses from additional
dividends in a later year. So, a shelter would not reduce tax
expense, but it could increase it. Not many Tax VPs would want
to take that risk, even before considering penalties.
The incentives to have taxable income arise abroad would
be reversed. With the U.S. as effectively a zero-rate jurisdiction,
tax managers would want the taxable income here. To the
extent that they may have the ability to skew their transfer
pricing without moving operations, they would now try to skew
it in favor of the U.S. To the extent that they needed to move
operations to satisfy the tax auditors in various countries, they
would be trying to move operations in to America, not out.
Instead of horrendously complex international corporate issues
characterized by economic imponderables, the IRS would be able
to tax nice, simple, Form 1099 dividend income.
By
fundamentally changing the rules in this manner the IRS would
finally be able to win the game, and win it in a way that actually
helps our companies and makes them want to have their
operations here. Continuing to engage in the audit game of catand-mouse when such a simple alternative exists is foolish.
Indeed, one has to wonder if the government actually wants to
win, or if it prefers to just engage in an elaborate charade to lull
American voters into thinking that something is being done
while lobbyists sleep secure in the knowledge that it is just a
show.
I.

Putting C Corporations on the Same Basic Tax Footing as
Pass-Through Entities, Without Double Taxation of
Corporate Earnings, so As to Eliminate Tax Distortion of
Entity Choice

The earnings of American corporations taxed as such, as
opposed to S corporations or limited liability companies that
elect to be taxed as pass-throughs, are currently subject to two
layers of tax, one at the corporate level and one at the
shareholder level. Pass-through entities are not themselves
taxable, but instead have their income currently taxed at
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individual rates in the hands of their shareholders. As a result,
businesses have increasingly been opting to avoid the benefits of
proper centralized management and liquid equity markets that
enabled corporations to drive the creation of the modern world.
In 1980, 83% of American firms were organized as pass-through
entities and they represented 14% of business receipts. In 2007,
those shares had increased to 94% and 38%, respectively.101
As David M. Walker, then comptroller general of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, has stated, the shift away
from corporate form “makes workers less productive than they
would be under a more neutral tax system. This results in
employees receiving lower wages because increases in employee
wages are generally tied to increases in employee
productivity.”102 While we have seen above that productivity
gains have not been passed along to employees overall over the
past 30 years, we have also seen that what wage increases there
have been have arisen exclusively in the corporate sector.
Distortion in choice of entity matters.
Shared Economic Growth would eliminate this distortion in
a simple manner. Corporations would pay out their earnings to
shareholders as Form 1099 dividend income, or else they would
suffer what amounts to a 35% tax penalty for failure to do so.
Tax would then be imposed at the shareholder level. The only
significant differences would be: 1) C corporations could only
pass along taxable income, not operating losses, so C
corporations could not be used to play individual tax shelter
games; and 2) while tax partnerships can have fabulously
complex allocations of income and other tax attributes to their
members, C corporations would just issue plain-vanilla dividend
income to all. Active tax planners might retain a preference for
pass-through form, then, but the current strong double-taxation
distortion in favor of pass-throughs would be eliminated, and the
system would shift in favor of a form of entity taxation that is
much easier to administer and patrol. This would be a win both
for the economy and for the IRS (and thereby for the bulk of U.S.
101. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING BUSINESSES THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX 1 (2012).
102. DONALD M. WALKER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-061113T, BUSINESS TAX REFORM: SIMPLIFICATION AND INCREASED UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION WOULD YIELD BENEFITS 10 (2006).
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taxpayers).
J.

Increasing Corporate Responsiveness to Shareholders and
Regulators

Corporations are often accused of placing operations outside
of the United States in order to avoid U.S. regulation.103 In my
experience most major American corporations do not behave
that way. Most actually prefer to run all of their operations as
if they were in the U.S. and dislike lax environments where they
need to exercise extreme diligence in patrolling their suppliers.
Singapore has become the most successful business location on
the planet not by being lax, but rather by being reliably orderly.
In contrast, the Chinese business environment, the wild east,
gives western executives nightmares. Regulations become
seriously annoying when they involve people making
unpredictable decisions and slowing things down, not when they
merely establish clear and logical standards that all businesses
must follow. Still, when the majority of corporate operations are
overseas, it is undeniable that the regulatory leverage of the
U.S. government decreases. Multinationals are potent entities,
and their international reach and ability to shift investments
gives them the power to make credible threats in the face of
proposed regulations that they do not like.
However, multinationals are profit-oriented creatures.
Given a choice between being in a location with a 0% tax and an
annoying, but not devastating, regulation or being in a foreign
location with a 25% tax, one can predict where they would choose
to locate their high-margin operations. Unless sum of the real
cost of compliance plus the wage differential is high enough to
overcome the tax rate differential, the corporation would not
move its high-margin operations out of the U.S. This would
strengthen our government’s ability to set appropriate

103. See Isaac Shapiro & John Irons, Regulation, Employment and the
Economy: Fears of Job Loss Are Overblown, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 12, 2011)
available
at
http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_and_the_economy_fea
rs_of_job_loss_are_overblown/ (notes this concern before going on to
demonstrate that there is little evidence for significant corporate flight from
regulations).
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standards without fear of disproportionate economic
consequences. It would help the government, as the supposed
representative of the people, to tame the multinational beast.104
Further, Shared Economic Growth would provide a platform
for helping to make the government listen more closely to
ordinary people. The Citizens United decision105 said that
corporations must be allowed to speak with their money, but it
did not say that they must be allowed a tax deduction for it.
Shared Economic Growth would create a general expectation
that the U.S. federal tax expense of corporations should be zero.
While lobbying expenditures, fines and penalties, a portion of
entertainment expense, and so forth are non-deductible now,
Congress could enhance the proposal by also providing that such
dubious expenditures could not be offset by the dividends-paid
deduction (i.e. that an amount of taxable income equal to the
non-deductible expenses could not be offset by the dividendspaid deduction), and by providing for line-item financial
accounting for federal tax expense. This would then provide a
clean, easy-to-read “corruption index” number in every public
corporation’s SEC filings showing just how much shareholder
money they are spending on things that shareholders might not
feel good about.
Why should corporations care about their corruption index?
That brings us to the second way in which the proposal would
help to tame corporations. As discussed above, one of the two
main reasons why corporations like to retain large amounts of
cash is that they do not want to have to persuade lenders and
shareholders to reinvest. While the proposal would allow
management to use cash freely to invest in U.S. operations, it
would flush out the cash that management might use to acquire
the stock of other companies or to engage in other expansionist
dreams.
Also, as previously discussed, it would provide
104. Here I am resisting using the new politically correct term of “worldwide American companies” because Orwellian terminology makes me
uncomfortable. With that said, our companies are American, whatever their
international scope, and that makes a difference. One need only look to what
happened after BP acquired Amoco in a supposed “merger of equals” to see the
difference. U.S. offices were wiped out with the loss of many well-paying
American jobs, a company that had strong focus on environment, health and
safety had a major U.S. explosion and a major U.S. spill, etc.
105. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Congress with the ability to prod corporations to pay out foreign
earnings not being used to expand same-country operations,
thus requiring an appeal to investors to fund major new foreign
operations. Management would have to go to the market more
often for money, and would have to be more concerned about how
the market views them.
Currently there are various “ethical” mutual funds that
seek to invest in companies that are well behaved. Such funds
have a problem in that they are keying off of elements on which
different people take different views. A very large portion of the
American public, on the other hand, could be expected to agree
that they do not like their companies to incur fines and
penalties, to engage in unusual amounts of entertainment, or to
spend a lot of money influencing elections. A simple corruption
index statistic at the tax line would provide a vehicle through
which unions and pension beneficiaries could pressure their
investment trustees to avoid companies with a high index. It
would provide a popular measure by which ethical investment
funds, trustees, and individual investors could judge corporate
behavior.
Similarly, other widely disapproved behaviors outside of
this corruption index, such as CEO pay, could become the subject
of pressure. Under current law shareholders tend to rely on
shareholder initiatives to complain about such things, but the
system is wired to insulate management pretty effectively
against that weapon.
Corporate raiders can threaten
management with proxy fights at substantial cost to the
corporation, but that vehicle is far from an ideal control
mechanism, and it serves only to increase focus on profit.
Managers who needed to face the market to get funding for
acquisitions and major expansions, in contrast, could face a
different scenario. Shareholders could have real power to
remind corporations that their owners have concerns in life
beyond just profit. If shareholders chose not to use that power,
if they decided to be content with profit at any cost, that would
be their prerogative, but they would have a chance to redirect
things down a more balanced path if they wished to.
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K. Ending the Current General Practice of Compensating
Corporate Executives for Artificial “Growth” That Consists
Only of Retaining Earnings Rather Than Paying Them Out
As Dividends
Researchers have linked the prevalence of executive stock
option plans to management’s fondness for engaging in stock
buy-backs.106 The math here is fundamentally straightforward,
if not entirely simple. Executive stock options give managers
the ability to make money from an increase in share prices, but
not to profit from dividends. Say a company with a 1,000 shares
outstanding and a per-share price of $10 ($10,000 total value)
issues 100 executive stock options with a strike price of $10, i.e.,
the right to buy 100 new shares for $10 each. The company earns
$2,200, or $2.20 per existing share, so that (all else equal) it now
has a value of the original $10,000 plus $2,200 for the cash-inpocket, or $12,200. From the market’s point of view, the price
per share should now be computed by assuming that the
executive stock options are exercised. That would bring in
another $1,000 for the share exercise, for a total company value
of $13,200, and would leave 1,100 shares outstanding. $13,200
divided into 1,100 shares is $12, and so the share price should
rise to $12.107 If the company pays out those earnings as a $2.20
dividend, the share price will drop back to $10. In that case,
management’s options would be worth nothing, management
would get no benefit from the dividend, and the existing
shareholders would get $2.20 per share. Now suppose that,
instead, the company uses $1,200 to buy back 100 shares at $12
a share, and the executives then exercise their options. The
company will then have 1,000 shares outstanding, $1,000 of
remaining cash earnings, and $1,000 from the option exercise.
106. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and Incentive
Compensation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6467,
1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6467 (finding that the average executive
in her sample of firms with repurchase activity enjoyed a $345,000 increase in
stock option value as a result of the repurchase activity).
107. Reality is more complicated. The market will probably not value the
$2,200 of retained cash as worth $2,200, because the market usually does not
quite trust management to invest that money efficiently, based on the market’s
experience with corporate managers in general. But this illustration is
directionally correct.
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It will thus have a value of the $12,000 distributed over 1,000
shares, or $12 a share. The executives will therefore have
received value of $2 per share on their 100 options, or $200. The
prior shareholders will likewise receive $2 per share, rather
than $2.20 in the dividend scenario. If the executives chose to
exercise their options without paying a dividend or doing a buyback, they would receive the same $2 a share.
Through stock buy-backs, then, corporate management can
shift funds from the pockets of the shareholders into their own,
while saying that this is simply compensation for management’s
great work in making the company grow in value. In our
example, though, and commonly in real life, that “growth in
value” just arose from refusing to pay shareholders their cash
profits. Stock buy-backs give management the same profit on
their options that they would receive if they paid out no money
at all, but since they involve cash going to a portion of the
shareholders they offer the image of money “being paid out to
the investors.” In reality, they involve management picking the
investors’ pockets.
Now, this is not the whole story. Management cannot, as
such, give stock options to themselves – they must be awarded
by the Board.
Further, there are other reasons why
management and the Board prefer to pay out cash as buy-backs
rather than dividends. Shareholders do not like it when
dividends are reduced, but get less excited when a buy-back
program is turned off. Further, analysts and shareholders have
been trained to parrot supposed wisdom about the value of
growth in earnings per share, even when that “growth” flows
only from share repurchases. Be that as it may, it remains a fact
that stock buy-backs are a form of trick.
Is this significant? Consider the case of non-deductible
excess compensation. I.R.C. § 162(m) limits deductions for
compensation paid to executives to $1MM, except for
performance-based pay. Because stock prices must rise in order
for incentive stock options to be worth anything, stock option
plans were deemed to be inherently performance-based, evading
the more complex restrictions placed on bonus plans and the
like.108 Because stock prices can be made to rise merely by doing
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (2015) provides that:
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stock buy-backs, however, options are essentially free from any
requirement of real performance. They thus became quite
popular, CEO pay ballooned further, and the nature of the
incentive both drove risky behavior and reduced dividend payouts.109
Okay, so it is a trick, it has aggravated a phenomenon (skyhigh CEO pay) that most Americans despise, it makes it more
difficult to judge real corporate success, and it de-links
management focus from operational factors that would really
add shareholder and societal value in favor of unproductive, but
simpler, financial games. Could it nonetheless be that lowering
dividend pay-outs stimulates growth and boosts the economy?
While many people choose to think so, the real answer is “no.”
Robert D. Arnott and Clifford S. Asness did an interesting
study110 in which they checked to see if lower dividend yields and
higher within-corporation investment were correlated with
higher subsequent growth. They found exactly the reverse.
There is a strong positive correlation between dividend pay-out
ratios (i.e. the percent of earnings paid out as dividends) and
subsequent earnings growth. It is particularly interesting to
note that the authors tested whether this appears to be due to
management engaging in empire-building through making
unproductive investments. Their data was consistent with that
hypothesis. In times of low pay-out, more investment was
occurring, but that investment was relatively unproductive in

[c]ompensation attributable to a stock option or a stock
appreciation right is deemed to satisfy the requirements of
this paragraph (e)(2) if the grant or award is made by the
compensation committee; the plan under which the option or
right is granted states the maximum number of shares with
respect to which options or rights may be granted during a
specified period to any employee; and, under the terms of the
option or right, the amount of compensation the employee
could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the
stock after the date of the grant or award.
109. See Kenneth R. Ferris & James S. Wallace, IRC Section 162(m) and
the
Law
of
Unintended
Consequences,
SSRN
(Dec.
2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942667.
110. Robert D. Arnott & Clifford S. Asness, Surprise! Higher Dividends =
Higher Earnings Growth, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 70 (2003).
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producing future earnings or GDP growth.111
As posited above, when corporations pay out their cash into
the economy and allow it to be redeployed to its highest and best
use, it fosters increased GDP growth and increased overall
growth in corporate earnings. The data thus show that Shared
Economic Growth should, by increasing dividend pay-outs,
directly benefit America’s overall growth and profitability.112
Cash would flow to managers who demonstrate a real ability to
use it well, rather than sticking in the pockets of managers
focused on financial games.
L.

Improving the Efficiency of Our Allocation of Talent by
Eliminating the Strong Tax Preference for Pursuing
Unproductive – and Often Destructive - Speculation Rather
Than Productive Work, While at the Same Time Improving
the Perceived Fairness of Our Tax System

Consider two families. One family had income of $7,000,000
and is a typical member of the tax group earning between $5MM
and $10MM in 2007. They got 27% of their income from salaries
and wages, 20% from partnership income (they are “small
business”), and 43% from long-term capital gains and qualifying
dividends, with the rest from miscellaneous, mostly passive
sources. Their tax rate, before FICA, was 22.8%. Counting both
the employer and employee side of FICA, it was 23.9%. The
other is a dual-professional couple, an engineer and a research
scientist, who make $100,000 each, which places them in the top
3% for 2007. Their tax rate, before FICA, was 19.6%. Counting
both sides of FICA, it was 34.6%.
The former couple was among those who were profiting
heavily from the speculation and financial engineering that led
directly to the financial crisis and the meltdown of our economy
in 2008. The latter couple was quietly engaged in innovation to
drive our economy in the future. If one were to do an opinion
poll of the American people, which of the two families’ activities
would we most wish to encourage? Shouldn’t our tax policy
111. Id. at 80-81.
112. From the current 31.5% payout ratio, a 54% increase to 48.5% would
shift from a predicted ten-year real earnings decline to a predicted ten-year
earnings growth. Id.
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reflect that preference? At minimum, shouldn’t our tax policy
treat the second couple as favorably as the first? (The 2013 tax
changes have closed the gap a little, but the working couple
would still be about 5 points worse off on this income profile).
The main driver of the low tax rate on financial speculators
is the special low rates on capital gains, which for 2013 are 20%
on joint returns over $450,000113 or zero on qualifying “small
business” (i.e. under $50,000,000) stock.114 We are told that
capital gains preferences are necessary for three reasons: 1) to
stimulate investment and growth; 2) to avoid locking in cash
investments in particular assets when that money could be more
efficiently redeployed elsewhere; and 3) to reduce the double
taxation of corporate income. Because Shared Economic Growth
would eliminate the double taxation of corporate income, the
third rationale goes away. Reason (2) has been aggravated by
the 2013 changes to the estate tax provisions, which give couples
with estates of less than the $10.5MM estate tax threshold an
incentive to try to hold onto appreciated assets until death so
that they can get a basis step-up and avoid tax altogether.
Shared Economic Growth greatly reduces that problem as to
stock, however, by squeezing the earnings out of corporations as
current dividends, eliminating artificial “gains” from retained
earnings. The remaining question, then, is whether low capital
gains rates are important to growth.
The answer is “no.” Capital gains rates show no correlation
with real GDP growth over the 1950-2011 period – indeed,
higher tax rates correlate slightly with higher growth.115 There
is no good evidence that reduced capital gains rates stimulate
investment to any significant degree.116 If this seems surprising
113. I.R.C. § 1(g) (2012).
114. I.R.C. § 1202 (2012).
115. See Leonard Burman, Capital Gains Tax Rates and Economic
Growth
(Or
Not),
FORBES.COM
(Mar.
15,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/leonardburman/2012/03/15/capital-gains-taxrates-and-economic-growth-or-not/;
Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Joint Hearing Before the
H. Comm. On Ways and Means and S. Fin. Comm., 112th Cong. 36-52 (2012)
(witness testimony of Leonard E. Burman, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Professor
of Pub. Affairs, Maxwell Sch., Syracuse Univ.).
116. See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RES. SERV., THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION (2010); Steven Fazarri & Benjamin
Herzon, Capital Gains Tax Cuts, Investment, and Growth (Levy Econ. Inst.,
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based on news stories you have seen, think about who provides
the grant money and speaker fees for economists to study the
effects of capital gains rates and to issue press releases (hint:
they are not poor).117 The public discussion surrounding capital
gains taxation has generally not been one of unbiased academic
inquiry, but rather has been characterized by parties seeking to
support a conclusion who find persons willing to supply flawed
studies to fit that conclusion. This works by doing things such
as confusing changes in capital gains realizations proximate to
a rate change with real changes in economic activity. Further,
the public discussions tend to shy away from the dry truths in
numbers and to focus instead on the more enjoyable stories of
entrepreneurial heroes and simple-minded invocation of
common assumptions.118 The same people who insist that
Reagonomics was a wonderful thing ignore the fact that Reagan
wisely eliminated capital gains preferences in 1986 because they
were not helpful to the economy, and that GDP in 1987 and 1988
grew at the same rate it did in 1985 and 1986. Likewise, the
same people who argue ferociously that government interference
in the economy just produces efficiency-destroying distortions
ignore the fact that capital gains preferences are highly
distortive.119
Even if one believed, despite the lack of evidence supporting
such a belief, that paying normal tax rates on capital gains
would cause individuals to spend their money on consumption
or put it under a mattress rather than making profitable
investments, this expensive subsidy would be difficult to justify.
To begin with, in the aftermath of the Great Recession our
economy has been demand constrained rather than capital
constrained. Therefore, getting the wealthy to spend their

Working
Paper
No.
147,
1995),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=109968.
117. Cf. David Kocieniewski, Academics Who Defend Wall St. Reap
Reward, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013, at A1.
118. See generally Joseph J. Cordes et al., Academic Rhetoric in the Policy
Arena: The Case of Capital Gains Taxation, 19 E. ECON. J. No. 4, 459 (1993).
119. See Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/business/yourmoney/29view.html?ex=134
3448000&en=c45247ad01379f01&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=per
malink.
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money rather than speculate with it would be stimulative and
would improve the economy, not hurt it.
Further, special capital gains rates provide the same
subsidy for an investment in China Mobile stock or gains on
Irish government bonds that they provide for investment in
Green Mountain Power or other U.S. companies. Investments in
foreign companies or foreign bonds clearly do not provide any
significant benefit to the American economy. According to
Federal Reserve data, nearly a quarter of the equity owned by
U.S. persons in 2012 was foreign.120 Thus, even if it did
stimulate investment, this would be an inefficient way to
stimulate investment in America.
While special capital gains rates are not justifiable as an
economic matter, they are absolutely intolerable from a social
equity point of view. As a starting point, consider the below
table showing 2010 net capital gain realizations by income
bracket.121
Income Group
Top 0.1%
99-99.9%
95-99%
90-95%
80-90%
60-80%
40-60%
20-40%
0-20%

Percent of Net Capital Gains, 2010
47%
23%
16%
4%
5%
3%
1%
1%
0%

Having 47% of all realizations go to the top 0.1% of the
population is not a ratio that promotes equality, and so likewise
providing a tax benefit that follows that allocation is not
designed to promote equality. A recent study by Dan Ariely of

120. See I.R.S. Statistics of Income, supra note 75 (referring to Federal
Reserve Flow of Funds tbl. L 213).
121. Distribution of Long-Term Capital Gains and Qualified Dividends by
Cash Income Percentile 2010, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/T09-0490.
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Duke University122 examined the degree of economic equality
that our electorate wants and what they think we have
compared to our actual degree of equality. Professor Ariely
determined that Americans would like to live in a country where
the top 20% of the population would have some 30% of the net
wealth and the bottom 20% would have about 10%. They think
that in America the top 20% currently has just under 60% of the
wealth and the bottom 20% has some 5%. They would be
dismayed to learn that in fact the top 20% of Americans own
close to 85% while the bottom 40% own zero.
Of course, the mere fact that Americans want a far more
equal society than we have does not mean that it would be
correct to adopt Robin Hood redistribution. With regard to
capital gains rates, however, the question is whether the
government should be allowing an exceptional tax benefit that
aggravates our skewed wealth distribution. Absent a strong
policy or ethical reason to the contrary, the basic principles of
democracy would say no, we should not have a policy that goes
against the desires of the American public. We have already
established that special capital gains rates are not helpful to
economic growth, and that not allowing a special benefit is not
equivalent to forcible redistribution. Therefore, democracy
should prevail and the preference should be abolished.
This is not a radical socialist point of view. Progressive
taxation is consistent with classical conservative principles.123
There is evidence that progressive taxation and increased
economic equality help to boost the health of the economy.124
122. Dan Ariely, Americans Want to Live in a Much More Equal Country
(They
Just
Don’t
Realize
It),
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
2,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/americans-want-to-livein-a-much-more-equal-country-they-just-dont-realize-it/260639/.
123. Mark Hoose, The Conservative Case for Progressive Taxation, 40 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 69 (2005). There is also increasing agreement that inequality is
harmful to the overall economy, ultimately harming the rich as well as the
poor. See, e.g., Michael Spence, The Distributional Challenge, PROJECT
SYNDICATE
(Jan.
9,
2014),
https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/michael-spence-addresses-the-rising-wage-andincome-inequality-that-is-jeopardizing-social-cohesion-and-political-stabilityworldwide#.
124. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation,
45 B.C. L. REV. 993 (2004); Iourii Manovskii, Productivity Gains from
Progressive Taxation of Labor Income (Dept’ of Econ., Univ. of W. Ohio,
Working
Paper,
2002),
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Economists have argued that progressive taxation is an efficient
mechanism for ensuring that the economic benefits of
globalization are distributed in a manner that ensures public
support for increasing the economic pie.125 Mainstream religious
teachings also support progressive taxation.126 There is no good
reason not to support the overwhelming American view that our
government policies should not be permitted to aggravate our
undesirably high level of inequality. Special preferences for
capital gains, which are effectively unjustified special
preferences for the well-to-do and especially for the überwealthy, must go. Shared Economic Growth corrects this
problem in a manner that adequately negates any colorable
concerns that might otherwise favor special capital gains rates.
M. Other Advantages
While Shared Economic Growth was not specifically
designed to address these concerns, it could be expected to be
beneficial.
Few mainland Americans give much thought to Puerto Rico,
despite the fact that our fellow citizens there carry the same blue
passports as the rest of us. While an extended discussion of
Puerto Rican history and the statehood debate is beyond the
scope of this article, those who are familiar with the Puerto
Rican economy will recognize that it has been heavily dependent
upon the ability of Puerto Rico to offer businesses low tax rates
outside the reach of the U.S. corporate tax. Proposals to make
Puerto Rico a state have been frustrated in part by the fact that
local factories could be expected to flee to other nearby islands,
such as the Dominican Republic, the minute that Puerto Rico
loses its special tax status. Shared Economic Growth would
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/%7Emanovski/papers/prod_gains_from_prog_tax.
pdf.
125. Kenneth F. Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, A New Deal for
Globalization: Wages Falling, Protectionism Rising, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 1,
2007); David Wessel, The Case for Taxing Globalization’s Big Winners, WALL
ST.
J.
(June
14,
2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118177155165934441.html.
126. Matthew J. Barrett, The Theological Case for Progressive Taxation
as Applied to Diocesan Taxes or Assessments Under Canon Law in the United
States, 63 JURIST 312 (2003).
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eliminate this problem. Puerto Rico’s status could then be
determined by the will of its residents and the mainland
population without regard to tax. That would be a healthy
improvement.
America’s racial and ethnic tensions seem to be increasing.
Again, that is a very broad topic, but here suffice it to say that
the decline of the middle class and the polarization of the
workforce is unhelpful in reducing tension. The restoration of
the market power of workers would contribute to the personal
power and dignity of workers of all backgrounds in a way that
government distributions could never hope to do. Our social
fabric, as well as our economic fabric, depends on the market
power of working people. Proposals to try to boost worker
market power by strengthening unions are mere wishful
thinking in a context where employers have no incentive not to
pick up their operations and move them in response to union
muscle flexing. In a world that adds another billion to its
population at shorter and shorter intervals, the supply of
workers as such is effectively infinite. What we need is to create
demand for American workers, a limited resource, and Shared
Economic Growth would do just that.
Finally, by eliminating existing distortions in investment
incentives the proposal could help to encourage filling some odd
gaps in our market. We now have an extraordinary number of
very wealthy people in this country that cannot figure out
enough ways to spend their money. Historically, that sort of
development led to the growth and strength of an artisan class
who produced the nice things that the wealthy enjoyed, for a
healthy price, and the growth and strength of that class
produced the sort of Marxian dialectic that put a check on the
power of the wealthy. In modern America, while one can find
many catalogs filled with startlingly expensive toys, clothes, and
junk, there has not been a resurgence of craftsmanship. One
does not visit new neighborhoods to find ingenious architecture,
quality handmade tiles and carvings, unique graphic arts, and
the like, but rather one looks at the preserved structures from a
century ago. That is weird, it is a market failure, and it
suppresses a huge class of people who might not be academic
stars, but who could be amazing craftspeople. Nobody seems to
be out there finding, training, and harnessing that talent pool.

57

2015

IT’S NOT THAT DIFFICULT

975

Is it a reach to suppose that changing the focus of U.S. industry
from the model of investing in foreign plants that make cheap
stuff destined for sale in Walmart to a model of finding ways to
invest in U.S. production might trigger a return to
craftsmanship? Perhaps, but wouldn’t it be interesting to try the
experiment and see what happens?
IV. The Numbers – Is This Reality, or Is This Just Fantasy?
I have already walked through an overview of the elements
of the proposal, so here I will just focus closely on the
computation of the numbers, based on 2010 data. The summary
is as follows, with all figures in billions. Note that the values of
some of these individual numbers depends on the sequence in
which one computes them, but the total is not affected by that
sequence:
Cost of reducing corporate tax revenue to zero:
(This is the maximum cost of the proposal)
7.65% tax on individual income over $500K, gross:

($ 223)

$ 99

Less 2.35%/3.8% Medicare contribution on such income:

($ 13)

Less 3.8% Obamacare tax on passive income:

($ 29)

Turning corporate foreign tax credit into deduction:

$ 77

Elimination of preference rates on qualified dividends:

$ 19

New withholding tax on dividends to foreign holders:

$ 33

Partial repeal of capital gains rates per proposal:

$ 55

Net surplus from above:

$ 18
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Amount of dividends above the $554 actually paid in
2010 needed to reduce corporate tax to zero given
the change of FTCs to a deduction:

$311

Loss of offset due to companies paying extra
dividends to eliminate tax cost of turning FTCs
into deductions:

($ 77)

Individual and withholding tax benefit from
incremental $311 of dividends at $0.1748 per $1:

$ 54

Total before IRA effects (18-77+54):

($ 5)

Incremental taxable IRA withdrawals:

$ 22

Net benefit:

$ 17

This is a worst-case scenario. If corporations paid out less in
dividends, tax revenues would increase by $0.1748 per $1.00 of
dividend less than the maximum deductible amount. If they paid
out more dividends beyond the deduction limit, revenues would
increase by $0.1145 per dollar of additional dividend (there
would be no incremental foreign withholding on such dividends).
If they brought home more foreign cash and paid it out as
dividends, revenues would increase by $0.1752 per $1.00 of
repatriated cash. Of course, these figures do not include the
revenue benefits of the economic and wage growth that would
flow from the proposal.
Because it is not clear when the increased IRA earnings
would be paid out, the discussion above treats the benefit from
ultimate taxation of increased IRA earnings as a future benefit,
but in practice it would be part current and part future. Thus,
the current effect of the proposal (leaving aside the expensing of
investment of post-enactment earnings in U.S. operating assets)
would be somewhere between a $5 billion cost and a $17 billion
benefit in this worst-case scenario. I do not propose any further
offsets because I believe it is highly likely that there would be
enough incremental cash repatriation from abroad to cover any
current revenue shortfall. (If corporations repatriated all of their

59

2015

IT’S NOT THAT DIFFICULT

977

foreign earnings, it would create an extra tax benefit of $62
billion based on 2010 numbers, so if some 10% of this cash came
home it would more than offset the $5 billion worst-case
shortfall). If that proved wrong, then it would be relatively easy
to plug the gap by tightening up some corporate benefits without
inflicting any harm on the businesses in question. In any event,
the proposal is at least $17 billion per year revenue positive in
the medium and long run.
Now for the details. The total corporate tax figure is from
the IRS Statistics of Income (“SOI”) spreadsheet,127 cell B92,
which ties to spreadsheet 10co01ccr.xls cell Q12. The gross
benefit of the proposed 7.65% levy on income over $500K is from
the SOI individual income by type spreadsheet, computed by
taking 7.65% times the sum of the Adjusted Gross Income Less
Deficit column for the brackets above $500,000. The subtraction
for the 2.35%/3.8% Medicare contribution is 2.35% (the employee
withholding amount) of the sum of the same brackets in the
column for Wages and Salaries, plus 3.8% (i.e. the full selfemployment tax amount) of the same total in the Net Income
from Business or Profession and Farm Net Income columns. The
subtraction for the 3.8% Obamacare passive income levy is 3.8%
of the sum of the same brackets in the columns for Taxable
Interest, Ordinary Dividends, Capital Gain Distributions,
Taxable Net Capital Gains, Rental Net Income, Royalty Net
Income, Partnership and S-Corporation Net Income, and Estate
and Trust Net Income.
The revenue from converting the corporate foreign tax credit
into a deduction is computed as (1-35%) x corporate foreign tax
credits claimed, as reported in cell B89 of spreadsheet
10cosbsec2.xls. The elimination of preference rates on qualified
dividends is computed by taking the dividend amounts in the
Qualified Dividends column of the individual-income-by-type
spreadsheet and multiplying each line by a factor that subtracts
the 2013 tax rate on qualified dividends for that bracket from
the 2013 ordinary income rate for that bracket. For some lines,
I had to interpolate. For example, the SOI table has an AGI
bracket running from $100,000 to $200,000. There is a marginal

127. I.R.S. Statistics of Income 2010. 2010 Corporation Source Book of
Statistics of Income, IRS (2010), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2.
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tax rate change at taxable income of $146,400 for a joint return.
Dividends and capital gains on directly held stock (as opposed to
stock held through IRAs and other retirement arrangements)
increase exponentially with income level, and AGI per return
rises exponentially as one rises above the median, while the
number of returns at any given level of AGI fall off along a bell
curve at incomes above the median. Therefore I applied the
lower tax rate to 50% of the income in this AGI bracket as a
rough approximation of the combined effects of AGI versus
taxable income, skewing of AGI, dividends and capital gains
towards higher incomes, and skewing of number of returns
towards the median. The sensitivity of the computation to these
interpolations is only minor, and in fact is completely negated in
the next step.
The effect of the partial repeal of capital gains preferences
is computed from SOI spreadsheet 10in04atr.xls, cell I49, which
shows the total tax reduction for 2010 from the use of alternative
rates on capital gains and dividends per the IRS. From this
amount, $74.2 billion, I subtracted the $19.6 billion effect of
favorable rates on qualified dividends as computed above. I then
used the latest information on capital gains by type, from 2007,
in spreadsheet 07in01ab.xls, to compute the portion of total
capital gains attributable to capital gains on residential, farm,
livestock, timber, and business personal property, which I
propose to leave at favorable rates because particularly powerful
interests will want that. I multiplied the ratio of those gains to
total gains by the $54.6 billion net capital gains benefit
computed above to get a $1.5 billion subtraction, leaving a
revenue increase from the partial repeal of capital gains rates of
$53.1 billion.
To compute the value of the new incremental 30%
withholding tax on dividends to foreign shareholders, I started
with SOI spreadsheet 10it02tc.xls, cell F10, which shows total
reported dividends paid to non-U.S. recipients of all types, and
simply multiplied that figure by 30% to get $33.4 billion.
The tax yield from the incremental $311 billion of dividends,
above the amount actually paid in 2010, needed to eliminate all
corporate tax (including the $77 billion in tax raised by
eliminating corporate foreign tax credits) is a more complex
computation. I proceeded by computing an estimated average
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revenue from income and withholding taxes on shareholders per
dollar of incremental dividend paid. To do this I started with the
tax payable, at full ordinary rates and including the 7.65% AGI
tax on income over $500,000, on the ordinary dividends received
by U.S. individuals in 2010, which would be $61.4 billion. I
added 35% of the estimated 2010 dividends paid to corporate
holders not entitled to the dividends received deduction, which
is only some $1 billion. This yielded a total tax amount of $63
billion.
I divided this number by the total of net U.S. dividends
PAID in 2010 plus a portion of the estimated dividends
RECEIVED by U.S. persons from foreign corporations in that
year. Since I did not have a good source for dividends received
by U.S. persons from foreign corporations, I had to estimate that
number by grossing up the dividends paid by U.S. corporations
to U.S. persons. Per the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds table
L213 for 2010, total U.S.-held equities totaled $19 trillion, while
foreign equities held by U.S. persons composed some $4.6
trillion, or 24.43%, of that total. So, if U.S. and foreign
corporations paid dividends at similar yield rates in 2010, then
24.43% of the dividend income received by U.S. persons should
have been from foreign corporations. To turn this into a usable
estimate of U.S. tax payable per dollar of dividend paid by a U.S.
corporation, I needed to take the $443B in dividends paid from
U.S. corporations to U.S. persons and divide that number by (124.43%), which is $586B. Effectively, this carves out the portion
of the U.S. tax payable on dividends attributable to the
estimated portion of the dividends that are foreign sourced. By
using the $63B U.S. tax payable on dividend income as
computed above as the numerator and $586B as the
denominator, I computed a U.S. shareholder income tax of
$0.1044 per $1.00 of U.S. dividend paid. I then calculated the
withholding tax on foreign recipients computed on actual 2010
dividends at a 35% rate (for incremental dividends, one must
count both the existing withholding and the incremental new
withholding, or 35% total on average), and divided that by the
$554B in net dividends paid by U.S. corporations to yield an
average expected withholding tax per dollar of dividend of
$0.0704, for a total revenue per dollar of dividend of $0.1748.
The SOI data only shows $187B in taxable dividends,
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reported as dividend income, out of an estimated $586B in
dividends received by U.S. persons. What happened to the rest
of them? That is something of a mystery. Some could be buried
under other lines, such as partnership or subchapter S income,
in which case they would be taxable and would add substantial
tax revenue to these computations. Since I do not have visibility
to such detail, however, I used the most conservative possible
assumption that all of these dividends flowed to equity holders
that are either permanently non-taxable (charities, state
governments, etc.) or tax-deferred (retirement plans and IRAs).
If one uses the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data for equity
holdings, some 4.93% of equities appear to be held by nonprofits
and governments, either directly or through mutual funds. This
would account for some $29B of the missing dividends as being
permanently nontaxable. The remaining $370B would then, by
default, be attributable to pension funds, annuities, IRAs, and
retirement plans, mostly tax-deferred, but not tax-exempt. This
is considerably higher than the $275B that one would expect
from the Flow of Funds equity ownership data. That may be a
product of the necessarily rough assumptions that the Federal
Reserve must make in its full-economy computations, or it may
be attributable to a bias in favor of holding high-yield equities
under retirement plans, or it may indicate that I am failing to
take credit for some $32B in additional tax revenue for dividends
hiding under other tax lines. In that case, Shared Economic
Growth would be very strongly revenue positive currently, while
still providing substantial additional revenue as the baby
boomers draw out their retirement funds.
V. Shared Economic Growth vs. the Corporate Consensus
Corporations do not agree with each other very much on tax
matters. They all have unique situations and unique
preferences. Still, after several years of talk about “fundamental
tax reform”, a basic approach has emerged and received backing
from both Republican and Democratic legislators, largely
because it does not require any creativity. I have labeled this
the “Corporate Consensus.”
The Corporate Consensus has two elements. First, broaden
the base and try to lower the rate to something like 25%. That
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was the heart of what was done on the individual tax side in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, before we spent the next 26 years
narrowing the base again, and so it is relatively easy for people
to agree that “that was good, so let’s do it again for corporations
now.” The second element is exempting foreign source income
from U.S. tax, otherwise known as adopting “territorial
taxation.” Our OECD peers all do this, so it is relatively easy to
agree, if everyone else does it, we should too.128
The Corporate Consensus certainly has positive features.
Territorial taxation would allow companies to bring their foreign
cash home. If they found some reason to invest that cash in the
U.S., they could do it without having the government snatch a
large part of the cash before it could be invested. Alternatively,
the companies could pay the cash out as dividends or through
stock-buy-backs, and if the shareholders found some reason to
invest the funds in the U.S., or if they wanted to spend the
money, they could do so. So that is better than current law.
Lowering the marginal tax rate would also be helpful. As a
general matter, corporations do not make investment decisions
on the basis of overall effective rates. They may account for
special benefits for particular activities, such as R&D credits or
the expensing of geological & geophysical costs, but if they are
deciding whether to locate a factory or a refinery in the United
States, they generally look at the 35% marginal tax rate (or the
32% rate for domestic production activities after the § 199
deduction), not the overall effective rate they pay on all their
U.S. activities. So, lowering the marginal rate to 25%, the same
rate as China, would substantially reduce the economic
incentive to locate high-margin operations in a jurisdiction with
a 12% or 0% tax rate.
However, the Corporate Consensus does not go far enough,
and it costs a lot to get there. Start with territorial taxation.
One can easily implement a version of territorial taxation that
will be scored as revenue neutral. This is done by making the
exemption only partial – say 95% - and/or by disallowing the
deduction of expenses deemed allocable to the foreign
operations. Unclean territorial taxation, however, places a
128. I leave aside the usual parental admonition, “if all of your friends
super-glued their heads to the floor, does that mean it would be a good idea for
you to do it too?”
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probably irresistible temptation in the hands of Congress. If a
95% exemption is okay, could 90% be that much worse? 85%? If
we get to 85%, then is 75% really such a big change? 50%? You
get the idea. Partial rules invite tinkering whenever a “pay for”
is needed, and so today’s cure for the ill of trapped cash would
likely become less effective over time. Other countries do
manage to maintain partial exemptions at steady levels, but
other countries also manage to maintain efficient and
disciplined health care systems, to exercise some budget
discipline, and to do other things that seem to be beyond our
political maturity.
Disallowance of expenses allocable to foreign operations
would be more actively problematic. Recall that America is no
longer the manufacturing center we once were. Our remaining
economic core consists of corporate headquarters functions, as
discussed above. Say that a company can hire an accountant
who will focus on its European operations, in a role that is
somewhere in the grey area where stewardship overlaps with
support services, and can place that person in the U.S.
headquarters or in a European operating company. If the U.S.
says that the cost of the employee, located here, would be
nondeductible, while the European jurisdiction would be less
fussy if a local person there is hired to do the work, where will
the corporation place the job?
The other problem with territorial taxation, of course, is
that it eliminates an annoying drawback of locating valuable
activities abroad. Companies that earn a lot of money have a
hard time figuring out how to use all of their foreign cash. They
are willing to suffer that annoyance rather than bring it home,
as can be seen from Apple’s or Microsoft’s financial reports, as
discussed above, but they do not like it. Territorial taxation
would make it easy for a corporation to place as much of its
operations as it wanted wherever it wanted them. Thus, it
would be important under such a system to ensure that the
company was motivated to place its operations in America. We
see that countries with territorial tax regimes have tended to try
to lower their domestic tax rates as well.129
129. For example, the U.K., which recently switched to territorial
taxation, has reduced its corporate rate from 26% in 2011 to 21% in 2014. See
Rates and Allowances: Corporation Tax, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
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That brings us back to lowering the corporate marginal rate.
The problem there is that many of the benefits that one could
dispose of in order to broaden the base happen to benefit
domestic activity.130 Let’s look at ten of the top corporate “tax
expenditures” for 2010.131 1) $7.2B for “Inventory property sales
source rule exception.” This is the rule under IRC § 863(b) that
allows 50% of the income from U.S.-manufactured property sold
abroad to be treated as foreign-sourced income and sheltered by
excess foreign tax credits. It thus subsidizes exports. 2) $7.0B
for the § 199 deduction. This directly subsidizes U.S. production
activities. 3) $4.9 billion credit for low-income housing. That is
clearly only for domestic activity. 4) $3.2 billion for reduced
rates on first $10MM of corporate income. Sacrificing those
rates, which tend to apply to corporations that are less global
than their larger brethren, in order to reduce overall rates does
not do much to help corporations as a whole. 5) $3.6B for LIFO
inventory valuation. That only significantly benefits companies
with old American operations. 6) $24.1B for depreciation in
excess of the alternative depreciation system. That benefit is
given exclusively, or nearly exclusively, to domestic operations.
7) $1.8B for charitable deductions to health organizations. That
is a domestic benefit. 8) $7.5B for exclusion of interest on publicpurpose state and local government bonds. That is a domestic
item. 9) $4.0 billion for the R&D credit. That is restricted to
R&D performed in the U.S. 10) $1.0 billion for the wind energy
credit under I.R.C. §45 – this is restricted to U.S. production
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rates-and-allowancescorporation-tax/rates-and-allowances-corporation-tax (last updated Apr. 2,
2015).
130. Reliance on merely lowering the rates has the additional drawback
that corporations may not regard the new rates as very stable. Investment in
plants invokes long-term thinking based on what is perceived as the stable
state. Thus, for example, when the U.S. gave China permanently favorable
tariff status instead of mere annual renewals in 2001, it resulted in a
pronounced outflow of U.S. jobs, even though the tariff rates were not reduced.
See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S.
Manufacturing Employment, (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working
Paper
No.
2014-04,
2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201404/201404abs.html.
Shared Economic Growth, in contrast, would provide a reliably permanent zero
effective rate. Id.
131. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014 (Joint Comm. Print, 2010).
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under § 45(e).
How much new revenue would we need to offset a corporate
rate reduction to 25%? The staff of the Congress’s Joint
Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) have addressed this question
twice. In a memorandum dated October 27, 2011,132 the staff
concluded that it would be impossible to reduce the corporate
rate to 25% in a revenue-neutral manner by eliminating
corporate tax expenditures, that the best rate that could be
achieved by eliminating all corporate tax expenditures would be
28%, and that even that figure would not be sustainable because
it relies heavily on eliminating timing benefits that would
reverse later. In this JCT estimate, the revenue loss from
reducing the rate to 28% as of January 1, 2012 was estimated to
be $40.5B in fiscal 2012 (the federal fiscal year ends on
September 30, so this is a partial year effect), $65B in 2013, $71B
in 2014, and some $76B a year thereafter. Reducing the rate to
25% would presumably cost some 10/7 times those amounts, or
$58B in fiscal 2012 going up to $109B by 2015.
A second study by the JCT staff was reported in a letter
dated July 30, 2013.133 This estimated that the revenue cost of
lowering the corporate rate to 25% as of January 1, 2014 would
be $73B in fiscal 2014, $112B for 2015, $124B for 2016, and
about $131B per year thereafter.
A 25% corporate tax rate would bring the U.S. down to the
level of China, but would still be far above the 0% to 12.5% rate
that corporations can pay elsewhere. It would not make us an
attractive location for business operations, it would just make us
less unattractive. However, as the JCT staff concluded, in order
to achieve that homely state we would need to sacrifice all of the
domestic corporate incentives noted above, plus all other
corporate incentives, plus raise taxes on non-corporate
taxpayers by some $40B a year.134 Shared Economic Growth
132. Memorandum from Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm.
on Tax’n, on Revenue Estimates (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.novoco.com/hottopics/resource_files/jct-memo_tax-expenditurerepeal_102711.pdf.
133. Letter from Thomas A. Barthold, Joint Comm. on Tax’n, to Hon.
Sander
Levin,
H.R.
(July
30,
2013),
available
at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.ho
use.gov/files/Scan001.pdf.
134. The recent proposal of House Ways and Means Chairman Camp
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reduces the effective corporate tax rate to zero, and imposes only
some $47B per year in taxes on income that does not directly
benefit from the corporate tax reduction. Effectively, an extra
$7B in offset allows an unbeatable 0% corporate rate instead of
a mediocre 25% rate.
Further, with individual tax rates peaking out above 40%
all-in, reducing corporate rates to 25% would create a significant
incentive to shelter income under a corporate shell, opening up
all sorts of new possibilities for the wealthy to avoid paying the
same levels of tax faced by normal working professionals. The
JCT estimates explicitly do not include the revenue loss from
those new tax games. As discussed above, Shared Economic
Growth would largely eliminate tax games, rather than creating
new ones.
The Corporate Consensus, then, involves going for a long
field goal when America is six points behind in the game. It will
be difficult to achieve, and while it might be somewhat better
than nothing we will still lose. Traditionally, America has
preferred to win. To win, we need a strategy that makes
America the best location in the world for high-value operations.
Shared Economic Growth is such a strategy. The Corporate
Consensus is not.

“addresses” this issue largely through budget-window tricks, changing the
timing of depreciation and amortization (which will reverse with a vengeance
outside the window), imposing a huge one-time tax on accumulated foreign
earnings, etc. He also proposes to impose 15% minimum taxation on highmargin foreign subsidiary income, which he labels as “intangible income”, even
where that income is from active operations related to the local foreign market.
For the reasons explained here, that would be highly unlikely to work for long
in our global economy, and would instead result in valuable operations shifting
into foreign hands, undermining U.S. administrative jobs and
our
technological edge. Chairman Camp needed to whack corporations with a stick
rather than using a carrot because he seeks to reduce direct net taxes on voters,
and he ran out of budget-window tricks to fund that one. See U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION
DRAFT
(2014),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=370
987.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/4

68

986

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

VI. The Tricky Bits: Treaty Overrides for Withholding Tax and
FTCs
Can Congress override a tax treaty through subsequent
legislation? Clearly yes, and Congress did so with respect to the
foreign tax credit provisions of many treaties in 1975 and
1976.135 Should Congress do so? That is a more complex
question, which appropriately turns on the fundamental
expectations of the parties in entering into the treaty.
A. Replacing the Corporate Foreign Tax Credit with a
Deduction
Let’s begin with eliminating foreign tax credits. Other
countries have felt free to switch from a foreign tax credit system
to a territorial tax system, despite their treaties with the United
States providing for the allowance of foreign tax credits. In the
two recent cases of the United Kingdom and Japan, both had
treaty provisions stating that they would allow a credit for U.S.
tax payable on an item of income. The United Kingdom had a
technical out in that the treaty provided that such credit would
be allowed against the U.K. tax imposed with respect to such
income,136 and the U.K. completely exempts the qualifying
135. Rev. Rul. 80-223, 1980-2 C.B. 217.
136. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
Gains, U.S.-U.K., opened for signature July 24, 2001, 80 Stat. 27 (entered into
force Mar. 3, 2003) [hereinafter U.K. Treaty]. Article 23(4) of the U.K. Treaty
provides:
[s]ubject to the provisions of the law of the United Kingdom
regarding the allowance as a credit against United Kingdom
tax of tax payable in a territory outside the United Kingdom
(which shall not affect the general principle hereof):
a) United States tax payable under the laws of the United
States and in accordance with this Convention, whether
directly or by deduction, on profits, income or chargeable
gains from sources within the United States (excluding, in
the case of a dividend, United States tax in respect of the
profits out of which the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as
a credit against any United Kingdom tax computed by
reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains by
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foreign income or dividends. Therefore, there is no local tax
against which a credit would be allowable under the treaty. In
the case of Japan, on the other hand, the treaty again provided
that such credit would be allowed against the Japanese tax
imposed with respect to such income,137 but Japan only allows a
95% exemption, and disallows any credit or deduction for the
foreign tax paid with regard to the income. Thus, contrary to
the express wording of the treaty, Japan does not allow U.S. tax
to be taken as a credit against the (limited) Japanese tax on U.S.
income.
Why can Japan do this? The treaty does allow them two sets
of wiggle words. First, the treaty credit provision is “[s]ubject to
the provisions of the laws of Japan regarding the allowance as a
credit against the Japanese tax of tax payable in any country
other than Japan.” So, Japan reserved the right to change its
foreign tax credit rules, though clearly the intent was not for
Japan to be permitted to simply eliminate foreign tax relief
while still enforcing the treaty credit provision against the
United States. Second, the provision stated the caveat that
“[t]he amount of credit, however, shall not exceed that part of
the Japanese tax which is appropriate to that income.” Japan
would argue that the 95% exemption is intended to account for
reference to which the United States tax is computed.
Id.
137. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, opened for
signature Nov. 6, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. 108-14 (entered into force Mar. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter “Japan Treaty”]. The Japan Treaty provides:
[s]ubject to the provisions of the laws of Japan regarding the
allowance as a credit against the Japanese tax of tax payable
in any country other than Japan:
(a) Where a resident of Japan derives income from the United
States which may be taxed in the United States in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention, the amount of the
United States tax payable in respect of that income shall be
allowed as a credit against the Japanese tax imposed on that
resident. The amount of credit, however, shall not exceed that
part of the Japanese tax, which is appropriate to that income.
Id.
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the fact that the Japanese parent is likely deducting
stewardship expenses equal to some 5% of the U.S. dividends, so
that the effective tax on the U.S. income inclusive of
apportionable expenses is really zero, and so the “appropriate
amount” of U.S. credit is likewise zero.
In either case, then, the important thing is not the
allowance of the credit contemplated by the treaty provision, but
rather the avoidance of double taxation, as the title of Article 24
of the U.K. treaty (“Relief from Double taxation”) indicates. The
British and Japanese foreign dividend exemption systems avoid
double taxation by simply not taxing (or minimally taxing) the
foreign income, and so the credit may be eliminated as
unnecessary.
The Shared Economic Growth proposal
eliminates, or offers to eliminate, U.S. taxation for corporations
by allowing a dividends-paid deduction. Thus, it also renders a
foreign tax credit unnecessary for corporations.
However, the proposal is less straightforward than the
territorial taxation systems in that it requires the corporate
recipient of foreign income to do something (pay a dividend) in
order to avoid U.S. tax. Is this a critical difference? Arguably
not.
In 1976, Congress adopted a law,138 with treaty overrides,
that shifted from a “per country” foreign tax credit system to a
world-wide credit computation. Before that change, if a U.S.
company earned $100 in the U.K. and paid $30 of U.K. tax, and
lost $100 in Germany, it would receive credit for the full $30 of
U.K. tax and could use the German loss against other income.
After the 1976 Act, it would have net foreign source income of
zero and would not be able to claim credit for any of the U.K. tax
paid. This change, shifting from “we will allow a credit for U.K.
tax paid on U.K. net income” to “we may allow a credit for U.K.
tax paid depending on a company’s overall global tax position”
was considered reasonable. Is a change to “we will eliminate
U.S. tax on U.K. income if a company pays out those earnings as
dividends” substantially less reasonable? At least then the U.S.
tax treatment depends only on what happens to the U.K.
earnings, not on what operations in other countries are doing.

138. Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. 94-455, § 1031, 90 Stat. 1520, 1620-24 (1976)
(amending I.R.C. § 904).
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Now consider a “reform” proposed by the Obama
The
administration in its 2014 revenue proposals.139
Administration has proposed that foreign tax credits be
subjected to full global pooling. In other words, a U.S. parent
would need to pool the earnings and taxes of all of its controlled
foreign subsidiaries. To illustrate, if its U.K. subsidiary earned
$100 and paid $21 in tax while its Dominican Republic
subsidiary earned $100 and paid $0 in tax, then a $79 dividend
from its U.K. subsidiary (all of its after-tax income) would result
in U.S. tax of $21.63 rather than $14 (i.e. the U.S. tax rate minus
the U.K. tax rate times the U.K. earnings) under the current
system. Thus, the Administration proposal would say “we will
allow credit for U.K. tax paid on U.K. income, but only if and to
the extent that the U.S. parent takes dividends of all of the
earnings of all of its foreign subsidiaries.” Is that less aggressive
than saying “we will eliminate U.S. tax on U.K. source earnings
if the U.S. parent pays out the U.K. taxable income as
dividends”? The primary difference between the two, in my
view, is that the administration proposal would make American
corporations extremely reluctant to take dividends from even
their high-tax subsidiaries, while Shared Economic Growth
would make it easy for companies to bring home and invest as
much of their foreign subsidiaries’ income as they wished. In
terms of treaty policy, the Administration’s proposal is more
aggressive.140
Further, at the cost of a little complexity, one could tweak
the Shared Economic Growth proposal to make it at least as
treaty-compliant as the Japanese law. This could be done by
providing that dividends paid would be deemed to come first
from foreign source income, and that corporations would have
an election between claiming the dividends-paid deduction for
dividends paid out of foreign source income, or else claiming a
foreign tax credit. So, for example, say that a corporation had
$130 of foreign-source taxable income, credits of $30, and U.S.139. DEP’T
OF
TREASURY,
GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS
OF
THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 48 (2013), available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2014.pdf.
140. This is not to say that the Administration’s proposal is not
controversial. See, e.g., Robert H. Dilworth, Proposed Multilateral FTC Pooling
and U.S. Bilateral Tax Treaties, 55 TAX NOTES INT’L 1045 (2009).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/4

72

990

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

source taxable income of $400. If it elects to take the dividendspaid deduction on foreign source income, it will have a deduction
rather than a credit for the $30 of foreign tax. Total taxable
income will be $500, and it will need to pay a $500 dividend to
eliminate its U.S. tax. If it pays only $400, it will have $35 of
U.S. tax. If it instead claims a foreign tax credit, it will have
$130 of foreign source taxable income, and its first $130 of
dividends will not be deductible. It will have a U.S. tax liability
of (35% x $130)-$30 credit or $15.50 on its foreign income, and
$400 x 35% = $140 on its domestic income, or $155.50 total. If it
pays a dividend of only $400, it will receive a deduction of $400$130=$270, worth $94.50, and will have total U.S. tax of
$155.50-$94.50=$61, rather than the $35 above. If it pays out
$500, it will have a deduction of $370 worth $129.50, and will
owe U.S. tax of $26 rather than $0. Its minimum U.S. tax, if it
paid out $530, would be $15.50, and could go no lower. In short,
a company would generally be stupid to elect to take the foreign
tax credit, but it would be entitled to do so if it felt desperate to
hold on to its cash. Our treaty partners would then have no
technical or theoretical grounds for complaint.
B. The 30% Incremental Withholding Tax
This is the most difficult piece. Again, Congress clearly has
the power to override the treaties to impose such a tax, but
would doing so be likely to cause our treaty partners to retaliate?
The justification for the withholding tax would be that the
foreign shareholders would suffer no net harm from the
combination of the allowance of the dividends-paid deduction
and the imposition of the 30% withholding tax, because the 30%
withholding tax would apply only with respect to dividends as to
which the paying corporation claims a deduction.141 So, the
shareholder would receive a dividend amount grossed-up by an
141. Because the dividends-paid deduction would be capped at currentyear taxable earnings plus unused earnings within the NOL carryback period,
the corporation would generally know at the time of payment whether or not
the dividends in question were deductible. If a corporation paid out
aggressively during the taxable year, regulations would provide that there
would be initial withholding with a right of the foreign shareholder to reclaim
once the corporation certified that the dividends in question exceeded
deductible earnings.
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amount that would cover the incremental withholding tax, or at
minimum would see the value of its shareholding increase by the
amount of the withholding tax.
One could make this reality clear by providing for a threepronged election. As a default case, dividends paid to a foreign
party would not be deductible, but the statute would provide
that the corporation could achieve this result by paying out a
deductible dividend to all shareholders, while withholding and
paying over the corporation’s own 35% tax liability (as a
prepayment on its regular corporate tax liability) with respect to
the dividends paid to foreign shareholders, and allocating that
differential liability to the foreign shareholders and reducing
their dividends accordingly. This could be phrased as a federal
provision providing that foreign shares would always constitute
a separate class of stock (but one whose character can switch
freely depending upon the identity of the shareholder) that
would bear the burden of the differential tax treatment of
dividends paid on that class of stock. The 35% deduction-offset
amount would thus not be treated as a dividend paid to the
foreign shareholders, and they would suffer normal withholding
tax only on the net amount remaining after the reduction. That
would leave them precisely where they are today.
The foreign shareholders would be given an alternative
election to have dividends paid to them be deductible to the
corporation, with no reduction, and to pay a 30% incremental
withholding tax on the entire amount of the deductible
dividend.142 They would also be given a second alternative
election to have the dividends paid to them be deductible to the
corporation, and to file a return and pay tax on the dividend at
the top U.S. individual rates143 as a simplified form of deemed
142. As is noted below, this simple 30% incremental tax could instead be
imposed as a replacement withholding tax of 35%, waiving normal treaty
withholding taxes as to deductible dividends, flipping to standard withholding
for any non-deductible dividend. That would make the nature of the simplified
flow-through tax clearer, but one would think that that goal could be served
more easily by just talking about it with our treaty partners.
143. The U.S. is not obligated under the non-discrimination provisions of
the treaties to provide the full allowances and reductions available to domestic
taxpayers to a foreign taxpayer with limited U.S. income. For example, Article
25(5) of the U.K. Treaty provides: “Nothing in this Article shall be construed
as obliging either Contracting State to grant to individuals not resident in that
State any of the personal allowances, reliefs and reductions for tax purposes
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flow-through income.
What would this do? It would have the result that a
corporation paying a dividend to a foreign national would be able
to claim a deduction under the same conditions as if it paid the
dividend to an American taxpayer,144 i.e., that the recipient pay
U.S. tax thereon at the standard rates or at an appropriate
withholding rate. Foreign nationals would be able to pay the
same tax on U.S.-source dividend income that a U.S. taxpayer
would pay, albeit without the benefit of the lower rate
brackets.145 Alternatively, foreign recipients would be able to
elect to rely on the limited treaty withholding tax rates on
dividend income, but in that case they would not be able to assert
the privilege of holding shares on which a corporation could pay
deductible dividends.
Is this approach overly “cute”? Not if you view it against the
background of the treatment of the former U.K. Advance
Corporation Tax (“ACT”). Under the old ACT scheme, a form of
imputation credit, when a U.K. corporation paid a dividend it
was obliged to pay tax on the dividend paid at a rate equal to the
grossed-up146 “basic rate” payable by moderate-income
individuals, so that the corporation paid out a total amount
equal to the dividend (paid to the shareholders) plus the basic
rate tax on the grossed-up amount of the dividend (to the
government). This tax payment was then effectively credited
twice. First, the corporation itself was able to apply the ACT to
reduce its corporate tax liability, so that at the end of the day
the corporation was liable for tax computed under the normal
corporate tax rules.147 Second, the dividend recipients could
credit the ACT against their individual tax liability on the sum

which are granted to individuals so resident or to its nationals.” U.K. Treaty,
supra note 136, at art. 25(5).
144. This complies with the Japan Treaty and the U.S. Treaty. See Japan
Treaty, supra note 137, at art. 24(3); U.K. Treaty, supra note 136, at art. 25(3).
145. This complies with the Japan Treaty and the U.S. Treaty. See Japan
Treaty, supra note 137, at art. 24(1); U.K. Treaty, supra note 136, at art. 25(1).
146. In other words, at a rate that would equal the basic rate multiplied
by the sum of the dividend and the tax.
147. This was the problem with the ACT system. Because corporations
were fundamentally liable for the full amount of the regular corporate tax, the
ACT system did not provide the incentive that the Shared Economic Growth
proposal provides to site valuable operations in the home country.
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of the dividend plus the credit148 (a deemed taxable dividend
amount) or receive a refund for the excess ACT credit, subject to
various complications that evolved over time.149
The U.K. took the position that the ACT was not a
withholding tax because the levy was technically imposed on the
corporation (although the corporation was immunized against it
by being able to credit it against the mainstream corporate tax)
rather than the shareholders. However, the gross-up rate
computation and the deemed taxable dividend amount at the
shareholder level were both based on an amount equal to the
nominal dividend plus the tax, which implied that the real
amount of the dividend was the grossed-up figure, and thus that
the levy was actually a levy on the shareholders with the
corporation merely acting as a withholding agent. Further,
since the ACT credit was a credit against domestic liability, the
U.K. took the position that it was under no obligation to allow
the credit to foreign shareholders, effectively permitting the
U.K. to impose a high-rate withholding tax solely on foreign
shareholders.
To see this more clearly, let’s consider two scenarios based
on U.S. 35% tax rates. In both scenarios, a corporation has net
income for the year of $100 after accruing corporate tax expense
of $54. In Scenario A, the corporation pays a dividend of $100,
pays an ACT-style levy of $54 to the government, and credits
that $54 as the payment of the $54 in tax expense it had already
accrued. The government then gives the shareholders a $54
credit against their personal liability on a deemed taxable
dividend amount of $154. Thus, the corporation has paid out
$154, $100 to the shareholders and $54 to the government, and
has no further tax liability, and the shareholders have received
$154 (including the credit) and are taxed on a $154 deemed
dividend. In scenario B, the corporation pays a dividend of $154,
but it is not obliged to pay $54 of its own funds to the
government. Rather, it is obliged to withhold and pay over $54
from the dividend as a withholding tax on the shareholders. The
corporation then receives a $54 credit against its accrued tax, (or
equivalently receives a deduction of $154 for the dividends paid),
148. Finance Act, (1972) § 87(2) HALS. STAT. (U.K).
149. See generally Rev. Proc. 2000-13, 2000-1 C.B. 515; Rev. Proc. 80-18,
1980-1 C.B. 623.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/4

76

994

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

and the shareholders receive a $54 credit against their regular
tax. Thus, the corporation has paid out $154, $100 to the
shareholders and $54 to the government, and has no further tax
liability, and the shareholders have received $154 and are taxed
on a $154 dividend. This is exactly the same as Scenario A,
except for one thing, that in Scenario A the corporation records
net income for the year of only $100 offset by dividends paid from
earnings of $100 while in Scenario B the corporation records net
income of $154 offset by dividends paid from earnings of $154, a
pure matter of accounting.
In the international context, if the withholding tax in
Scenario B was improper, then it would appear that the U.K.
engaged in a shocking bit of legerdemain. The standard OECD
treaty would apply in Scenario B to say “the withholding tax on
a foreign shareholder may not exceed 15% of the distribution, so
the maximum withholding tax is 15% of $154 or $23.10.”
Instead, purely because the accounting liability, as opposed to
the economic liability, for the $54 was placed on the paying
corporation, the treaty allowed a $54 withholding tax, even
though the company’s payment of that amount reduced the
payable dividend from the $154 that the U.K. tax computation
was based on (remember that the tax liability was set at the
target tax rate times the sum of the dividend and the ACT) to
$100, with the exact same effect on the shareholder as if a $54
withholding tax had been imposed on the real dividend amount
– the amount that U.K. shareholders received and were taxed on
– of $154. A taxpayer who tried such a transparent ruse with no
significant economic effect would be laughed out of court. The
respectable U.K. government, however, was allowed to get away
with it without any great furor, and the U.K. was far from alone
in enacting similar imputation credit schemes that cut out
foreign investors.
That said, it did not escape the attention of Britain’s treaty
partners that Britain’s ACT system was discriminatory and
effectively got around the treaty restrictions. The U.S. therefore
negotiated a new treaty with the U.K. that effectively recharacterized the tax back into a withholding tax and applied
the usual treaty restrictions to it, although this still resulted in
the imposition of a withholding tax on U.S. shareholders that
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was not imposed on British holders.150 In any event, this was a
matter of negotiation, not a claim of right. As the American Law
Institute Advisory Group summarized it, “Foreign countries
with imputation systems have generally been reluctant to grant
credits to U.S. shareholders, largely because the U.S. does not
grant integration credits to foreign (or domestic) shareholders.
Nevertheless, some such countries have been willing either to
make shareholder credits available to U.S. investors or to reduce
otherwise applicable withholding taxes as part of a tax
treaty.”151
The fact that it is a matter for negotiation, not a treaty
abrogation, is a key point. The U.S. Treasury has previously
recommended that relief for foreign investors under any form of
corporate integration should be a matter for negotiation, not a
unilateral gift from the United States, in order to ensure that
U.S. investors receive overall equivalent treatment on their
investments in the treaty partner jurisdiction, and further noted
that other countries attempting corporate integration generally
took a similar approach.152 In these negotiations, the United
States would properly take the position that America had the
right to tax corporate income at full rates. To again quote the
A.L.I. Reporter:
Whether the foreign investment in the U.S. is
through the branch of a foreign company, the U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign company, or a U.S.
company with portfolio foreign shareholders, the
United States would seem to have a perfectly
legitimate source country claim to tax the income
produced by that investment. In the context of
150. See Letter of Submittal from C.W. Robinson, Sec’y of State, to the
President of the United States (June 8, 1976) (regarding the Convention
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the avoidance
of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income signed at London on December 31, 1975, and an exchange of notes
signed at London on April 13, 1976, modifying certain provisions of the
Convention).
151. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAX ADVISORY GROUP
DRAFT NO. 21: REPORTER’S STUDY 144 (1992) [hereinafter REPORTER’S STUDY].
152. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS--TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 79 (1992).
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integration, such a claim should not be considered
discriminatory, because the U.S. would enforce an
equivalent claim against domestic investment
through a U.S. company owned by U.S.
shareholders by means of an income tax on those
shareholders, for which the corporate tax was a
withholding device.153
In this view, the traditional dividend withholding taxes
recognized under the treaties were never intended, under the
classical corporate double-taxation scheme upon which the
treaties are based, to interfere with full source-country taxation
of business income. A country is thus entitled to announce, “we
are going to deem corporate income to be taxable at the
shareholder level on a modified flow-through basis as to foreign
investors, and tax it at our top individual rate.” In the scheme
proposed above, America would be imposing such a flow-through
tax on foreign shareholders in a far-simplified form, avoiding
shareholder taxation until cash is distributed, and then
effectively passing through all of the corporate deductions and
credits to the shareholder because the new withholding tax
would be imposed only up to the amount of income corresponding
to the corporation’s net tax liability. While I have proposed
implementing a 30% incremental withholding tax on deductible
dividends, this really amounts to a target 35% final withholding
tax on deductible dividends with a waiver of normal treaty
withholding rates, but with that tax reverting to the normal
treaty (or non-treaty) withholding rates on any non-deductible
dividends. One could mechanically implement that flip in an
explicit way, but our treaty partners should be able to appreciate
that the 30% incremental tax on deductible dividends is simpler.
There is nothing objectionable about that change in terms of
treaty theory.
If our treaty partners responded in kind by making
equivalent changes in their own domestic laws, we could choose
to grant reciprocal reductions of the withholding tax, and all of
the countries involved would still end up with tax systems
superior to those they have today. The one thing that I would
153. REPORTER’S STUDY, supra note 151, at 149.
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caution against would be granting such reciprocal benefits to
countries that chose not to impose substantial taxes on the
dividend income received by their citizens. Shared Economic
Growth is based upon ensuring that income is taxed once, at the
individual level, at reasonable rates. If one were to poke holes
in the tax net by allowing treaty partners to become havens for
dividend-receiving tax exiles, the structure would be threatened.
America has the power to prevent people from accessing our
resources to build fortunes and then fleeing to a friendly haven
to avoid paying back a fair share of what our system helped
produce, since few wealthy persons would really be willing to
self-banish themselves from our shores and our stock exchanges
just to avoid a moderate level of tax. We have far more practical
power over individuals in this manner than we have over
corporate operations. However, we could lose that power if we
are not mindful of the threat of evasion and if we fail to take
reasonable steps to control it.
VII. Nothing Else Solves the Problems
As explained above, the Shared Economic Growth proposal
meets all of the objectives of corporate tax reform, encouraging
U.S. investment and strengthening American companies,
essentially eliminating tax shelters and transfer pricing
concerns, encouraging the efficient use of capital, reducing the
incentives for risky behavior, eliminating double taxation, and
improving the progressivity of the system, all in a manner that
is simple to administer, safe to implement, and revenue
balanced in the short run and revenue positive in the medium to
long run, even before factoring in growth. It does all this and
more. The numbers are real and the methodology is permissible.
The corporate consensus proposal does not accomplish these
goals. Neither imputation credits nor dividend exclusions would
get us there. Replacing the corporate tax with a VAT would
create terrible progressivity, entity-choice, and tax shelter
problems. Treating corporations as traditional flow-throughs
would be horrendously complex, and would not give corporations
a positive incentive to locate operations in America. There are
not a hundred plausible alternatives out there, but there is one
that accomplishes the objectives, and one is all we need. The
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interesting question then becomes whether anyone in Congress
is really interested in accomplishing these goals. Unsolved
problems result in a continuing stream of campaign
contributions. When one looks at purportedly difficult policy
problems, it is often difficult to determine whether Congress
really cannot find a good answer, or if they just do not wish to.
For corporate taxation, we may now resolve that question. If
there is a will to solve the problems, then there is a solution.
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